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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the roles played by the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force in 
the formulation of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) policy from 1918 to 1945. Its focus is on 
policy relating to the use of air power, specifically fixed-wing shore-based aircraft, against 
submarines. After a period of neglect between the Wars, airborne ASW would be 
pragmatically prioritised during the Second World War, only to return to a lower priority as 
the debates which had stymied its earlier development continued.  Although the intense 
rivalry between the RAF and RN was the principal influence on ASW policy, other factors 
besides Service culture also had significant impacts. These included the interface between the 
military and political spheres and the impact of key individuals on policy setting.  Within the 
RAF, intra-Service debates on the appropriate use of air power influenced policy direction, as 
did the exploitation of the new technologies so fundamental to ASW, which both shaped and 
were shaped by policy. By examining these factors this thesis will show the varying influence 
exerted by the RN and RAF in policy setting for the use of air power in ASW. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
As submarines emerged as a significant weapon in the First World War, aircraft 
established their ability in countering this new threat.  The formation of the Royal Air Force 
(RAF) in 1918 meant that maritime air power was no longer the natural preserve of the Royal 
Navy (RN). This left airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) as a capability placed 
between these two Services, which were competing for position in an austere post-war 
economic climate.1  This thesis will aim to examine the roles of the RN and the RAF in the 
formulation of airborne ASW Policy though to the end of the Second World War, and the 
impact this had on the evolution of the use of air power to counter subsurface threats. 
Examination will show the history of airborne ASW to be one of subjugation to other 
platforms.  The RN promoted the use of naval vessels rather than aircraft in ASW, whilst the 
RAF would often promote other roles for aircraft, most notably bombing.  The Second World 
War proved the inadequacies of this policy approach, which had stifled the development of 
airborne ASW in the interwar period, as the losses inflicted by German U-boats threatened 
Britain’s ability to continue in the War.  This pressure bought about a pragmatic policy 
reversal to place more emphasis on the use of air power in ASW, leading ultimately to 
victory in the trade defence war.  The underlying factors which had retarded the earlier 
development of airborne ASW remained, however, and came to prominence once again in 
the closing period of the War and after.   
                                                          
1Anti-Submarine was originally abbreviated to A/S, for the purposes of consistency the abbreviation ASW will 
be used throughout this work unless in direct quotation. This thesis will consider ASW as part of a strategic 
model of defence, rather than in relation to the self-defence of naval units. 
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Airborne ASW formed a natural convergence of interest between the RAF and the 
RN and as such formed a natural battleground for the rivalries between the two Services.  
There are, however, several other aspects to the roles played by the RN and RAF in this 
policy area beyond this rivalry.  These include the wider structure of defence and its interface 
with its political masters via the various ministries and committees prior to the formation of a 
Ministry of Defence.  Also of relevance were the structures and cultures present in the 
Services largely as a result of the RAF’s battle for continued existence in the interwar period 
and intra-Service rivalries within the RAF centred on the most appropriate use of air power. 
Within these factors other elements such as the disproportionate impact of key individuals 
and the role of new technologies served to further colour the dysfunctional relationships 
within in the defence organisation between the RN and the RAF as well as between the 
Services and their political leaders. 
 
Policy and Structures 
 Prior to further examination it is necessary to review and define the meaning of the 
term ‘policy’.  Policy is extant at a variety of levels throughout an organisation as large and 
cumbersome as the British military and the level at which it is being viewed serves to colour 
the definition of the term.  Looking at the interplay at the senior levels of decision making is 
the most useful approach to understanding the interaction between the RN and RAF.  It must 
be noted however that the organisational structure at play is not consistent through the period 
under discussion.   Whilst the grand strategic level of policy making remains the preserve of 
politicians, the relative control exercised at the strategic level shifts over time.   During the 
Second World War there is considerable direct involvement by the cabinet and ministries, 
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especially Churchill as Prime Minister, in military decision making.  This contrasted to 
peacetime when the strategic management of military affairs is more directly controlled by 
senior military officers and officials.  This shift in structure is reflected in the setting and 
enacting of policy, hence a relatively wide reaching definition of this term must be used.  For 
the purpose of this thesis therefore, policy will be taken to cover the attitudes, actions and 
intended plans of the government, at Prime-ministerial, Cabinet and Ministry level as well as 
the senior military apparatus reaching down to RAF command level and its RN equivalent.  
This approach is consistent with that taken in the standard works on interwar policy for both 
the RAF by H. Montgomery-Hyde and the RN by S. Roskill; whilst these works were 
produced some time ago they are still the most useful in examining this area.2 
 
The Literature 
ASW has been widely written on, though usually from a tactical rather than a policy 
perspective. The largest body of relevant literature is historical, which is naturally skewed to 
texts covering the two World Wars. It is useful to categorise these into official histories, 
academic texts, biographical works and popular narrative-type histories in order to 
understand what each can offer in the investigation of this subject. 
Official histories which include ASW cover a variety of subjects from entire conflicts 
to specific battles.  Whilst often based on detailed official records, they hold the inherent 
                                                          
2See H. Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy Between the Wars. (London: Heinemann, 1976),  p. xiii,  S. W. 
Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Vol.1  (London: Collins, 1968) and S. W. Roskill, Naval Policy 
Between the Wars Vol.2, (London: Collins, 1976), whilst Roskill does not provide a definition as succinct  
Montgomery-Hyde’s the subject is approached in the same manner.  
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disadvantage of potentially including the agenda of the organisation sponsoring the work.3 A 
potential benefit of this is that, providing this natural bias is taken into consideration, they 
can be used to understand the view of events at an organisational level. The overarching texts 
of this type include the Grand Strategy series, dealing with the 1930s and the entire Second 
World War period.4 At a policy level, Grand Strategy provides details of the various 
expansion schemes for the RAF.5 Analysis of the subsurface threat and the lack of aircraft to 
counter it are included in the naval strategy sections, in line with the contemporary prevailing 
view of the RN as having prime responsibility for ASW.6 Likewise, within the conflict itself, 
the focus is on the convoy system and the role of escorting surface ships.7 The interactions 
between the RN and RAF in policy setting are alluded to as showing the ‘heights of inter-
service bitterness’, though this is not examined in detail.8 The nature of variations between 
official histories of differing organisations can be seen by an opposing claim in the RN text, 
The War at Sea, that there was never any ‘ill-feeling between the two services’.9 This 
disagreement as to the extent of inter-Service discord will be seen again at the peak of ASW 
policy setting with the divergence of opinion over the motivating factors for the formation of 
the Anti-U-boat Warfare Committee in 1942. The Air and Naval Historic Branch narratives 
form another strand of official histories which must be treated with caution as, despite being 
                                                          
3For example of this see CAB 42/1/18 and CAB 103/97 for the standing orders of the Committee of Imperial 
Defence (CID) Histories section.  For more on official histories see C. Goulter, ‘British Official Histories of the 
Air War’  in J. Grey (Ed.), The Last Word?, (London: Praeger, 2003). 
4B. Collier, The Defence of the United Kingdom, (London: HMSO, 1957), also aspires to a neutral Inter-Service 
stance though in effect it defers to the RN viewpoint explicitly stating that the RN official history has suitably 
covered the U-boat conflict. 
5N. H. Gibbs, Grand Strategy: Vol.1, (London: HMSO, 1976), pp. 531-601 
6Gibbs, Grand Strategy: Vol.1, pp. 367-368, 433-434 
7J. R. M. Butler, Grand Strategy Vol.2, (London: HMSO, 1957) 
8Ibid., p. 24 
9S. W. Roskill, The War at Sea Vol.2,(London: HMSO, 1956), p. 90 
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based on often classified primary sources, they must still be considered as secondary sources 
due to their authors’ selectivity and the sponsoring Service’s input.10 
There are academic texts covering the entire time period of this thesis, several of 
which are relevant to the use of air power in ASW. Standard texts on inter-war policy exist 
for both the RN and the RAF, though these do not focus specifically on ASW.11 They 
provide an overview of the formation of the RAF and the various challenges it faced, 
including rivalry with the other Services; ASW and inter-Service relations in this area are not 
covered in detail. 
The body of literature relating to the Second World War is naturally far larger though, 
again, general texts yield little of use to this research area.12 Specialist texts on the anti-U-
boat campaign provide detailed narratives which, while they make mention of the various 
policy debates, do not analyse them in detail or give significant weight to air power's 
contribution to this battle.13 Unsurprisingly, those focused on Coastal Command are of most 
use in examining airborne ASW, though again these must be assessed on individual merit. 
The Cinderella Service, which provides an in-depth analysis of Coastal Command’s 
operations though the author's experiences as a front-line maritime aviator, heavily influences 
                                                          
10See AIR 41/45, 41/73, 41/47 41/48, 41/74 Air Historic Branch Narrative, The RAF in Maritime War Vol. 1-4, 
ADM 199/2377-2380 Royal Naval Historic Branch, Preliminary narrative for official history The War at Sea 
Vol. 1-4. 
11Montgomery Hyde, British Air Policy and Roskill, Naval Policy Vol.1 and 2, the latter must be viewed in light 
of the fact that Roskill also authored the RN official history of the Second World War, The War at Sea Series. 
One of the most useful accounts is J. Terraine, The Right of the Line, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1985), pp. 
223-250, 401-458, which includes information on airborne ASW for the duration of the period, J. Terraine, 
Business in Great Waters, 2nd ed., (London: Mandarin, 1990), takes ASW as its topic and includes the inter-war 
period though it is not focused on the policy dimension. 
12 For example R. J. Overy, The Air War 1939-1945, (London: Europe Publications, 1980), pp. 70-73, mentions 
but fails to examine policy debates, see also N. Macmillan, The Royal Air Force in the World War Vol.1, 
(London: Harrap, 1942), pp. 122-142 N. Macmillan, The Royal Air Force in the World War Vol.4, (London: 
Harrap, 1950), pp. 52-72 which focuses on providing a narrative tactical history of the use of air power in the 
conflict. For equivalent journal articles see G. C. Barrett ‘Coastal Command’ Royal United Services Institute 
Journal 87 (1942) and A. B. Ellwood, ‘Coastal Command’ Royal United Services Institute Journal 89 (1944). 
13 See P. Padfield, War Beneath the Sea, (London: Pimlico, 1995) and Terraine, Business in Great Waters.  
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this work.14  The same can be said of Aircraft vs. Submarine; however, the author's 
background in air electronic warfare makes this text exceptionally useful in understanding the 
technical aspects of this topic.15 Naturally, more narrowly-focused texts provide more depth, 
such as The Forgotten Offensive, giving considerable detail on the anti-shipping campaign.16  
An equivalent for the sub-surface conflict is The RAF and Trade Defence 1919-1945, which, 
though not specifically focused on policy, is absolutely to key to its examination.17 
The drawback of specialisation in the literature is that it can lead to a one-dimensional 
outlook. A common thread among texts on Coastal Command is the view that it was Bomber 
Command's poor relation in terms of resource allocation. However, the literature for Bomber 
Command takes an opposing view: that a large part of the bomber force’s ‘effort... [was]… 
devoted to the war at sea’.18 This is echoed in the despatches of the one wartime Air Officer 
Commanding in Chief (AOC-in-C), Arthur Harris recording ‘handicaps… [and]…lack of 
suitable aircraft in sufficient number’.19 Other texts expand this theme, arguing that Bomber 
Command was equally short of the aircraft and crews it needed to successfully perform its 
role in the War.20 Thus, specialist secondary literature must be viewed in the context of the 
wider body to account for its potential bias. 
                                                          
14 A. Hendrie, The Cinderella Service, (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2010) 
15A. Price, Aircraft vs. Submarine, (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2004) 
16 C. Goulter, A Forgotten Offensive, (London: Frank Cass, 1995) 
17 J. Buckley, The RAF and Trade Defence 1919-1945 (Keele: Ryburn, 1995) 
18 D. Richards and H. St George Saunders, The Royal Air Force, 1939-1945 Vol.2 The Fight Avails, (London: 
HMSO, 1954), p. 113. 
19A.T. Harris, Despatch on War Operations, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), p. 8 paragraph 8. 
20AIR 41/42 RAF Narrative (first draft) The RAF in Bomber Offensive against Germany: Vol. 4 A Period of 
Expansion and Experiment Mar 1942 - Jan 1943, pp. 1-22 recounts Bomber Commands equipment challenges 
citing the diversion of machines and crews to other commands as one of the major causes of shortfalls.  The 
Bomber command perspective on their battle for resources specifically against Coastal Command is also 
covered in C. Webster and N. Frankland, The Strategic Air Offensive Against Germany 1939-1945; Vol. 1, 
(Uckfield: The Navy and Military Press, 2006), pp. 310, 318, 325-6, 447, 452, for more on the context of this 
official history see S. Cox ‘Setting the Historical Agenda; Webster and Frankland  and the debate over the 
Strategic Bombing Offensive against Germany 1939-1945’ in Grey (Ed.), Last Word.  Other secondary 
literature supports these views on Bomber Command’s difficulties, see R. Neillands, The Bomber War: Arthur 
Harris and the Allied bomber offensive, 1939-1945, (London: John Murray, 2001), pp. 183-186, H. Probert, 
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Biographical works concerning the main players in policymaking are important to 
understanding this process.21 These must however be treated with caution as, although they 
provide potential first-hand accounts, they are not necessarily primary sources. By their 
nature, they tend to offer a single viewpoint, often influenced by the author's concern over 
their subject's historical status.  Although not strictly biographical, historical texts authored 
by the protagonists of events such as Churchill’s The Second World War series must be 
viewed in the same way.22 
Popular-type histories often cover specific aircraft types, squadrons or units in 
considerable detail.23 These can be problematic however as if they do contain comments on 
policy it can be tainted by their fundamentally parochial nature and the fact that they are not 
always fully referenced. 
Moving away from historical texts, airborne ASW is also represented within military 
theory literature, though it is absent from many air power texts.24  Naval theory texts tend to 
deal with the topic at a tactical rather than a policy level, though specialist works on ASW are 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Bomber Harris: His Life and Times, (London, Greenhill, 2001), pp. 146, 219-226. Obtaining aircraft and crews 
of sufficient type and number from the American entry into the war was also of concern; see D. Richards, Portal 
of Hungerford, (London: Heinemann, 1977), p. 310. It should be noted that Bomber Command was not just 
competing with Coastal Command for aircraft but also with other theatres of operation such as the Middle East, 
see A. W. Tedder, With Prejudice; The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, 
(London: Cassell, 1966), pp. 253-255. 
21 Some of these deliberately avoid discussion of policy; A. Boyle, Trenchard: Man of Vision, (London; Collins, 
1962), S. Douglas, Years of Command, (London 1966), pp. 245-273 contrastingly J. Slessor, The Central Blue, 
(London: Cassell and Company, 1956), pp. 483-488, 464-539 gives a good account of events in the 
management of ASW though this is in an explicitly stated context of championing the crews of Coastal 
Command.  
22 W. S. Churchill, The Second World War Vol. One - Six, (London: Cassell, 1948-54), for more on Churchill’s 
historical works see D. Reynolds, In Command of History: Churchill Fighting and Writing the Second World 
War, (London: Penguin, 2005).  This category is also includes P. Joubert de la Ferte, Birds and Fishes, 
(London: Hutchinson, 1960), with the author having commanded Coastal Command on two separate occasions; 
this text covers the history of the Command from formation through to the post-Second World War era. 
23 See for example C. Ashworth, RAF Coastal Command 1936-1939, (Sparkford: Haynes, 1992), D. Lake, 
Growling Over The Oceans: The Royal Air Force Avro Shackleton, the Men, the Missions 1951-1991 (London: 
Souvenir Press, 2010), J. Nash, On the Step: A History of 201 Squadron, (Kinloss, 1990) 
24 See for example J. Gooch (Ed.), Airpower, Theory and Practice, (London: Frank Cass, 1995) and P. 
Meilinger, Airwar: Theory and Practice, (London: Frank Cass, 2003). 
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of more use.25  Unfortunately, this topic has not yet attracted significant attention from 
equivalent air power theorists. The submariner’s perspective is of use in giving depth of 
understanding to the study of ASW though there is no secondary literature devoted to policy 
for the use of air power.26 
The secondary literature reaffirms the significance of ASW, though it is often given 
insufficient weight in relevant texts. From a policy perspective, where ASW is covered, the 
polarised nature of the debates of the time is often echoed in the historiography. This is 
especially true with the official history's dispute over the level of harmonious co-operation 
between the RN and the RAF and, more significantly, in the discrepancies between the 
bodies of literature associated individually with Coastal and Bomber Commands. While this 
thesis does not aim to provide a comparative study of these two Commands, it is important to 
appreciate that their fortunes were inextricably linked by the competition for resources and 
the resultant policy implications.  Unfortunately, none of the texts mentioned seek to 
specifically unite the RN and the RAF perspectives. Much like the discipline of airborne 
ASW itself, which sits between two spheres of operations, the study of the impact of the RN 
and the RAF on policy setting falls between natural areas of study.  This goes some way to 
                                                          
25 See G. Till, Airpower and the Royal Navy (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1979), M. Llewellyn-Jones, The 
Royal Navy and Anti-Submarine Warfare, 1917-49, (London: Routledge, 2006) and S. W. Roskill, The Strategy 
of Sea Power, (London: Collins, 1962), Roskill’s text tends to mirror the views of the official history he 
authored.  G. Franklin, British Anti-Submarine Capability 1919-1939 (London: Frank Cass, 2003), pp. 80-85, 
101-109 gives useful information of the evolution of air power in the ASW role.  Numerous journal articles also 
tackle this subject see for example D. Arnold-Forster, ‘The Organisation of the Anti-Submarine Service’, Royal 
United Services Institute Journal 77 (1932), C. Dennistoun-Burney, ‘The Influence of Aircraft on Sea Power’ 
Royal United Service Institute Journal 75 (1930) and A. Pallisera, ‘The Effect of Air Power on Naval Strategy’ 
Royal United Service Institute Journal 72 (1927), D. Arnold-Forster, ‘Our Anti-Submarine Requirements of the 
Future’ Royal United Services Institute Journal 74 (1929),  E. Robertson ‘The Value of Aircraft for Protecting 
Seaborne Trade’ Royal United Service Institution Journal 78 (1933). Such journal articles though secondary 
sources have a use in indicating contemporary views within the Services their use in assessing policy setting 
being determined by the seniority of their authorship. 
26See J. E. Moore and R. Compton-Hall, Submarine Warfare Today and Tomorrow, (London: Michael Joseph, 
1986), pp. 23, 156-160, and N. Whitestone, Submarine: The Ultimate Weapon, (London: Davis-Poynter, 1973), 
P. Gretton, ‘Anti-Submarine Warfare’ Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies Journal 118 (1973) 
and M. Wemyss, ‘Submarines and Anti-Submarine Operations for the Uninitiated’ Royal United Services 
Institute for Defence Studies 126 (1981) 
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explain its lack of exploration, along with the fact that the inter-Service rivalry makes it an 
unpopular topic for official studies in the same way that the lack of significant popular 
controversy makes it less attractive for other historians. This thesis will therefore aim to 
enhance this area of study by moving beyond a single Service viewpoint, to include both 
Services and the interaction between them with the goal of providing a more objective 
analysis.   
 
Thesis Content 
Controlling sea lines of communication (SLOCs) has always been of vital 
significance to Britain’s military and economic security. The exploitation of the surface and 
subsurface operating environment to deliver military effect in the First World War, and the 
threat it posed to that control, created new and unique challenges. The near impossibility of 
gaining subsurface supremacy other than in very limited areas required a shift from 
traditional military thinking; effective anti-submarine operations developed the use of several 
platform types, including other submarines, surface ships and aircraft. The experience of 
battle would demonstrate that the inherent characteristics of air power in terms of range and 
endurance made it a highly capable ASW asset and hence a useful conduit to the examination 
of ASW.   
As ASW policy is symbiotic with the development and utilisation of the submarine.  
The peace treaties and post-war austerity immediately after the First World War effectively 
re-set the clock for the development of submarines and, consequently, ASW.27  Thus 
                                                          
27 For further detail on the evolution air power in ASW in World War One see H. A. Jones, The War in the Air, 
Vol. I, (London: Imperial War Museum, 1999 [original 1922]), pp. 339-345, 369-370, H. A. Jones, The War in 
the Air, Vol. 4, (London: Imperial War Museum, 1998 [original 1934]), pp. 45-77, 408.  
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although ASW policy existed, prior to the end of the war, 1918 is an appropriate start point 
for this thesis, especially to examine the inter-Service dimension of this topic brought about 
by the involvement of booth the RN and the RAF.  The next break of this magnitude in the 
history of ASW came with the paradigm shifts associated with the advent of the nuclear age 
after the Second World War.  The changes in the landscape of defence brought about by this 
were so significant that this forms a logical endpoint to this examination.  Furthermore, in 
dealing with topics connected with the nuclear deterrent, primary source availability can 
become prohibitively restricted.28 
 The period under examination saw a gradual shift of Britain’s position away from that 
of an imperial power. Consequently, defence priorities also altered, firstly with the varying 
demands of policing an empire and then in line with Britain’s changing global position.  
Therefore, to assess the actions and influences of the agencies involved in the evolution of 
ASW policy, discussion will be limited to home waters, in this context defined as including 
the Atlantic Ocean, as these provide a consistently significant region to allow the study of 
policy evolution. 
Examination of the impact of the RN and RAF on ASW policy naturally includes the 
political dimension, and must also cover to a minor extent the influence of the British 
aerospace industry. The economic and political pressures of the aerospace industry did have 
some influence on the choice and procurement of capabilities, thus placing industry within 
the policy setting dimension. The level of influence would not however match that seen in 
                                                          
28The normal 30 year restriction for the release of files (For further detail on the release of documentation see 
‘Review of the 30 Year Rule’ http://www2.nationalarchives.gov.uk/30yrr/30-year-rule-report.pdf accessed 
1005, 03/01/2012) can be increased by higher security classifications associated with this subject. 
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later times; hence, greater focus on this area would be inappropriate and dilute the 
examination of the main factors influencing policy.29   
There are some problems inherent in attempting to tackle this subject area. Firstly, the 
nature of the subject necessitates the use of primary sources from both Services, as well as 
governmental sources.  Given the inconsistency of the filing methodology employed, this has 
the potential to skew the analysis by virtue of which papers are locatable. This problem is 
further compounded by the loss of various files, both accidentally and through deliberate 
weeding programs.  Studying policy in the interwar period also presents specific difficulties, 
as for ASW it will be seen there was in fact a distinct lack of policy.  Substantiating this is 
however problematic as proving the absence of policy in an era predating an overall 
controlling ministry for the armed forces depends on the records of numerous subsidiary 
committees and organisations, which, whilst offering the advantage of multiple sources to 
support the argument, can be far from comprehensive. 
The interaction of the RN and RAF in formulating airborne ASW policy can be seen 
as symptomatic of their overall relationship.  The impact of the two Services on ASW policy 
must therefore be understood in the broadest context.  In addition to the organisational 
interaction discussed the impact of personality on decision making must also be considered.  
Significance must also be attached to the relationship between technology and military 
capability and the influence this can exert on policy setting. By drawing on all these strands 
this thesis will show the failings of the RN and RAF to co-operate in the formulation of a 
robust and effective policy for the use of air power in ASW. 
                                                          
29 The relationship between the aircraft industry, government and the armed forces would grow in complexity 
after the Second World War, with industry exerting considerable influence on aircraft procurement, see for 
example K. Hartley, ‘The United Kingdom Military Aircraft Market’ in Yorkshire Bulletin of Economic and 
Social Research, Vol. 19, (1967). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Advent of ASW 
 The impact of the industrialisation and mechanisation of conflict in the First World 
War was evident in every operational environment.30  In the maritime sphere, the grand fleet 
action proved to be anti-climactic and signposted the beginning of the end for the primacy of 
capital ships in the projection of sea power.31  The decline of the leviathan battleship was 
mirrored by the gradual ascent of the submarine as a weapon. German use of U-boats grew 
exponentially from a small defensive cadre at the outbreak of hostilities to a large and still 
rapidly expanding force conducting unrestricted attacks on merchant shipping by the time of 
the armistice.32 Although the U-boat threat was ultimately defeated, by the end of the war 
they had proved capable of sinking several hundred large ships a month costing numerous 
lives and thousands of tons of cargo.33 
The often quoted statement of submarines as being an ‘unethical, underhand weapon, 
therefore…quite un-English’ serves to encapsulate the opinion still prevalent amongst the 
senior Royal Naval officers at the outbreak of war.34  Despite some vocal dissenters this 
attitude led to a relative lack of investment in submarines, with their crews forming a virtual 
underclass within the Royal Navy (RN).35  This approach was echoed in Anti-Submarine 
Warfare (ASW), thus Britain started the war able to conduct ‘little or no anti-
submarine…activity’.36 The challenge presented by the U-boat heralded a new kind of 
                                                          
30 J. Bailey, ‘The First World War and the birth of modern warfare’ in M. Knox and W. Murray (eds.) The 
Dynamics of Military Revolution 1300-2050, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 132-153 
31 G. Bennett, Naval Battles of the First World War, (London: B. T. Batsford, 1968), pp. 194-262 and A. 
Gordon, The Rules of the Game: Jutland and British Naval Command, (London, John Murray: 2005). 
32 R. Compton-Hall, Submarines and the War at Sea 1914-1918, (London: Macmillan, 1991) 
33 AIR 41/45 AHB, Narrative The RAF in Maritime War Vol. 1, Appendix 1 
34 A. Marder, Fear God and Dread Nought Vol.1, (London, 1952), p. 281 
35 Compton-Hall, Submarines and the War, p. 7-10,  
36 Ibid, p.89 
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warfare as both its detection and attack required a different approach to that used against 
surface units.  In the business of detection a variety of methods were investigated by the RN, 
in some lay the future of modern day techniques such as sonar.37 Tactical innovations 
included the birth of the convoy system as well as the Q-ship decoys, to respectively deter 
and lure the predatory U-boats.38  ASW used several platform types including submarines, 
surface ships and aircraft.  These used a variety of attack methods including gunfire, 
ramming, mines, depth-charges and torpedoes. The concept of using aircraft to counter 
submarines had been mooted in military circles prior to the War.39  The military aircraft itself 
was a relatively new technology, and their use in ASW experienced an exponential 
development through to the end of the war.  As aircraft usage grew, landplanes, seaplanes, 
ship launched aeroplanes, kite balloons and airships, all found ASW roles, coming initially 
from both the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) and later the 
Royal Air Force (RAF).40    
The early use of air power in ASW was in a purely observational role, as shown by 
the initial tasking priorities for the RNAS, which only mention U-boats as a target for 
scouting activity.41  The intense rate of tactical and technological development soon focused 
on developing more effective attack methods along with appropriate anti-submarine bombs. 
ASW was to become the main focus of RNAS operations and this continued under the 
                                                          
37 Llewellyn-Jones The Royal Navy, p. 9 
38 Q-Ships were merchant vessels with hidden armaments designed to trick a U-boat into attacking what 
appeared to be an unarmed vessel to allow them to in turn attack and sink the U-Boat, for further detail see J. 
Corbett, History of the Great War, Naval Operations Vol. 3, (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1923), pp. 50-
53, their success was however relatively short lived see H. Newbolt, History of the Great War, Naval 
Operations Vol. 5, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1931), pp. 110-112 
39 Price, Aircraft vs. Submarine, pp. 3-6 
40 See H. A. Jones, The War in the Air, Vol. 6, and (London: Imperial War Museum, 2003[original 1922]) 
pp.334-340 for a synopsis of the various air vehicles in use for ASW in 1918.  
41 As stated in a Commander in Chief’s memorandum on the functions of a naval air service quoted in the RAF 
official history H. A. Jones, The War in the Air Vol. 2,  (London: Imperial War Museum, 2002[original 1928]), 
pp. 354-356 
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RAF.42  There was only one confirmed kill solely by an aircraft during the War, many tactics 
focused instead on deterring U-boat attacks.43  Hence it is inappropriate to measure success in 
this campaign purely in terms of destroyed submarines.  By the end of the war, the aircraft 
had proved its potential effectiveness as a weapon to counter the emergent submarine threat 
and the operations undertaken had signposted the need to develop both specialist munitions 
and airframes to maximise its effect.  The RAF ended the conflict with some 37 ASW 
squadrons in Britain, supplemented by 103 RN airships allocated to the same duty.44  There 
was also a foundation of operational experience on which to develop a joint ASW doctrine, 
though this potential was not to be realised in the inter-war period.  
 
Countermeasure Through Containment 
Whilst the Great War had only allowed the exploration of the rudiments of ASW it 
had given a clear indication of the level of threat posed by this new technology to an island 
nation so dependent at this time on its SLOCs. The armistice saw most of the German 
submarine fleet surrendered to the RN and the fate of those vessels as well as the potential for 
the future regeneration of a submarine capability were dealt with in the post-war peace treaty 
negotiations. 45   
The military view on the dangers of submarines was echoed at the political level, with 
Lloyd George considering their defeat the ‘crucial triumph’ of the war.46  The peace treaties 
eventually signed therefore made several provisions to address the threat, affecting all the 
                                                          
42 AIR 41/45 AHB Narrative The RAF in Maritime War Vol. 1, pp. 26-31, 40- 45 
43 J. Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare in World War 1, (London: Routledge, 2006), p. 1 
44 AIR 41/45 AHB Narrative The RAF in Maritime War Vol. 1, Appendices IV and V 
45 S. Roskill, Naval Policy Between the Wars Vol. 1, p. 75 
46 D. Lloyd George, War Memoires, (London: Nicholson & Watson, 1934), p. 1194 
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defeated powers.  These required the surrender of all submarines and related vessels to the 
Allies, as well as a ban on future building or acquisition of such vessels.47   
Having dealt with the threat in home waters the British sought to continue the policy 
of countering the submarine by preventing its existence.48   The main effort to achieve this 
was during the Washington Naval Conference in 1921-2.49  The British argument rested on 
the premise that the First World War had shown the submarine to be ineffective both in a 
defensive role and against warships.  Its only use therefore was to attack merchant targets, a 
universally condemned tactic, thus as a weapon it was ‘inconsistent with the laws of war’ and 
should be outlawed. 50  This view found little favour amongst the other conference 
participants and the end result was the Root Resolutions; a set of rules on the future use of 
submarines, as well as a brief ban on the construction of new vessels and limits on the size of 
future fleets.51   Despite the widespread agreement to the new rules the Admiralty had little 
faith in their enforcement taking a view that they ‘cannot be relied on when formulating war 
plans’.52  This did not detract from the attraction of this policy for politicians and attempts at 
limiting the possession of submarines by other nations would form a continuing thread of 
British policy in the interwar period.53   
                                                          
47 M. Lawrence (Ed.), The treaties of peace: 1919-1923. Vol.1, The Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty of St. 
Germainen-Laye and the Treaty of Trianon (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace , 1924), 
pp. 105, 107-108, 314-316, 505-50, M. Lawrence (Ed.), The treaties of peace : 1919-1923. Vol.2, The Treaty of 
Versailles, the Treaty of St. Germainen-Laye and the Treaty of Trianon (New York: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 1924), pp. 681-682, 847-848 
48 TNA: ADM 116/3165 Admiralty memorandum on The Washington Conference and its Effect Upon Empire 
Naval policy and Co-operation. 
49 For more detail see R. Buell, The Washington Conference, (London: Appleton, 1922), pp. 213-232, Y. 
Ichihashi, The Washington Conference and After, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1928), pp.72-82 
50 Buell, Washington Conference,, pp. 218 
51 Ichihashi, Washington Conference, pp. 81-82, 94,  
52 ADM 116/3165 Washington conference and its effect on Empire Naval policy and co-operation considered by 
committee of Imperial Defence. 
53 More detail on British attempts to limit the possession of submarines can be found in R. Chaput, 
Disarmament in British Foreign Policy, (London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1935), pp. 17-247, 363-369, see also 
CAB 32/44 for discussion of the continuation of this policy by the Imperial Policy Sub-Committee paper on 
Reduction and Limitation of Armaments. 
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Whilst this thesis is focused on ASW in home waters, it is worthy of note that having 
largely neutralised the threat from the defeated powers in Europe, much of the attention at 
this time was on the potential threat from Japan, especially with the shift in Anglo-Japanese 
relations in the wake of the Washington Naval Treaty.54  The Admiralty hoped that this 
would be countered by the United States developing more bases in the western Pacific; this 
desire however was left unfulfilled by the Washington Treaty arrangements.  Whilst the use 
of submarines in this theatre was considered as being of the ‘upmost value’, defence policy 
against Japan rested on the principal of ‘adequate Naval Forces, capable of offensive action 
[emphasis in the original]’.55  It was not anticipated that the Japanese would seek to attack 
merchant ships hence the submarine threat was seen as part of a potential attack on the main 
fleet to be countered accordingly by RN surface units.56  The minimalist RAF structure 
proposed by Trenchard in 1919 did not include any specific provision for ASW aircraft 
overseas, indicating that the use of aircraft against submarines in this theatre was not being 
considered.57  
The experiences of the First World War had proved the potential threat posed by the 
submarine as a weapon.  As part of the efforts to find effective counter measures both the 
RNAS and the RAF helped establish the utility of air power in ASW.  Although this thesis is 
deliberately focused on the period after 1918, it must be acknowledged that the conceptual 
and practical work undertaken in ASW prior to this constituted a potential foundation for the 
future use of air power in this role.58  The provisions of the peace treaties effectively reset the 
clock for the threat in home waters, providing a reasonably blank canvas for future ASW 
                                                          
54 Franklin, Britain’s Anti-Submarine Capability, pp. 9-19 
55 ADM 116/3165 Washington conference and its effect on Empire Naval policy and co-operation considered by 
committee of Imperial Defence. 
56 Franklin, Britain’s Anti-Submarine Capability, pp. 14-19 
57 AIR 1/17/15/1/84 Memorandum The Formation of the Royal Air Force on a Peace Basis  
58 See Abbatiello, Anti-Submarine Warfare for more detail. 
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policy.  The year 1918 thus represents a natural watershed in the evolution of ASW, and a 
logical point from which to begin its examination. 
 
Policy by Poverty 
Defence policy setting in the immediate post-war period was conducted in an austere 
climate of severe financial pressures coupled with optimism over the international security 
promised by the newly formed League of Nations.59  Whilst the stability and security of the 
new world order remained to be seen, the poor financial situation and need for economies 
were stark realities.  It was budgetary restriction therefore that formed the primary policy 
driver in this period.  This combination of optimism over the unlikelihood of a new conflict 
and financial pressures led to the policy declaration in 1919 from the Cabinet, that ‘It should 
be assumed…that the British Empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten 
years’.60  This would become known as the Ten Year Rule and with several reaffirmations 
formed the basis for defence policy until its removal in 1932.61  Further pressure for savings 
was placed on the armed forces and the RN in particular by the Geddes committee, though 
the impact of its report was lessened by the treaties from the Washington Naval 
Conference.62  The financial situation left the RN fighting hard for an ever reducing budget 
and the RAF for its very survival.  Whilst a more detailed examination of the impact of 
                                                          
59 For more detail on the hope for the success of the league of nations in providing international peace see J. C. 
Smuts, The League of Nations, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1918) and B. Dexter, The Years of 
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economic pressures on military policy at this time is beyond the scope of this thesis, it is 
necessary to note that their fundamental significance for all policy decisions in this period. 
The interwar period pre-dates the formation of the Ministry of Defence. At that time 
each branch of the military was run by its own independent ministry whilst advice on overall 
military policy and planning was provided by the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), 
along with its various ad hoc and standing sub-committees.63  At the centre of the CID was 
Maurice Hankey who was secretary to the committee from 1912 to 1938.  During most of 
this period he was also cabinet secretary.64  This central position allowed Hankey to exert 
considerable influence on the advice presented to cabinet on defence matters as well as the 
nature of the interaction between the Services.65 The longevity of Hankey’s involvement 
allowed the formation of personal relationships with those at the highest levels of the defence 
organisation; thus he was in a position to influence both the individuals involved as well as 
the process of the management of defence.66 The official histories of the First World War 
were commissioned by the CID and their content discussed in detail prior to publication by a 
specialist sub-committee, they can therefore be reasonably considered to reflect the views of 
that body.67    The texts dealing with the war against the German U-boats paint a picture of a 
                                                          
63 For more on the role of the CID see CAB 21/710 especially pamphlet The Machinery of the Committee of 
Imperial Defence, also CAB 21/260 minute from the CID secretary Sir Maurice Hankey dated 03 Apr 1923 
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65 For examples see Boyle, Trenchard, pp. 347-8, 484-6, 506, 697-8, W. Chalmers, The Life and Letters of 
David, Earl Beatty, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1951), p. 381-2, B. Ranft (Ed.), The Beatty papers: 
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67 Official histories were administered by the Historical Section of the CID, which began the collation of 
material whilst the war was still in progress see CAB 42/1/18 and CAB 103/97 for the standing orders of this 
section.  In 1922 Cabinet instructed the setting up of a specific sub-committee to control this function (minute in 
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campaign halted prematurely by military successes in other theatres, and speculate as to the 
optimism for victory expressed by both sides had the conflict continued.68   When dealing 
with the impact of the German submarine campaign the histories are unequivocal as to the 
pressure this tactic had exerted stating that ‘the strain to which British commerce and 
shipping were subject was beyond all previous experience’.69  It can therefore be surmised 
that there was significant recognition of the extent of the problems posed by submarines in a 
war time scenario.  When used as commerce raiders, submarines posed a serious threat to the 
fighting capability of Britain and during the conflict the German U-boat had not actually been 
defeated.  
This appreciation of the potentially ‘grave extent of the submarine menace’ is echoed 
in the disarmament policies already discussed.70  Despite this, ASW does not feature in the 
immediate post-war work of the CID.  The agenda for the committee does not include ASW 
nor is it a topic of any of the numerous sub-committees.71  It can be seen therefore that at the 
overarching tri-Service policy level there was no significant discussion of ASW, though it is 
unclear if this was due to shortcomings of the CID or a belief that the provisions of the peace 
treaties had nullified the threat.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
CAB 27/182). Various other reports show the control exerted over these texts from the funding and selection of 
authors to editorial approval of the texts at a cabinet level, CAB  21/ 182, CAB 21/212, CAB 16/52,3. 
68 Newbolt, History of the Great War, pp. 361-362 
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Moving from the CID it can be seen that the two Services involved each took their 
own distinct stance on ASW.  Whilst obviously constrained by the provisions of Ten Year 
Rule, the Admiralty felt it would be a ‘criminal…gamble’ to rely on this planning 
assumption.72  Internally a serious view was taken on the submarine threat both from those 
acting outside the legal provisions of international agreements for the use of submarines 
against merchant ships as well countries using them legitimately.73  A 1921 paper on naval 
policy summarises this view: 
‘The Admiralty rest under no delusions, however, as to the capabilities of submarines 
for legitimate naval operations, and this opinion, based on war experience, has been 
confirmed in Fleet Exercises which have since been carried out.’74 
 
The clearest indication of the RN view on the potential of this relatively new weapon 
was the apparently contradictory view taken on the RN’s own submarine programme.  
Despite having advocated the abolition of the submarine, the Admiralty continued the RNs 
own development and construction programme.  Given the prevailing financial constraints 
this involved considerable argument with the treasury.  Ultimately the number of vessels 
involved was relatively modest and the programme focused on development of a standard 
design to allow large scale construction of vessels at short notice if required.75   The 
development of RN submarines was not however part of an anti-submarine strategy.76  
Although specific ASW vessels were originally suggested, as part of the reduction in the 
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number of different classes it was concluded that such tasking could be undertaken as a 
secondary role of other types.77  Despite the RNAS having pioneered the use of aircraft in 
ASW in the First World War, interwar RN ASW policy rested almost entirely on surface 
craft using officers trained as ASW specialists.78  The foundations for this belief in the 
superiority of surface craft lay in the emerging technology of sonar (then referred to as 
ASDIC).79  The RN was keen to embrace this new technology, creating a dedicated research 
establishment at Portland for its trial and development.80  Throughout the 1920s the level of 
confidence and interest in sonar grew.81   The results of this work were published in progress 
books including the reports from exercises conducted.  Whilst it is clear the RN was seduced 
by the possibilities of the new technology of Sonar, it is unclear whether this was developed 
as a result of the RN identifying it as the best solution to a capability gap or as an emergent 
technology promoted by its developers and latched upon as a definitive solution.  By 1929, 
the report shows a policy based on sonar equipped surface units with the role for aircraft 
being reconnaissance if the conditions were unfavourable for sonar.82   Aircraft were 
dismissed in the prosecution of a target submarine due to the lack of a suitable anti-
submarine bomb.83  The absence of aircraft from RN ASW policy is however less surprising 
taking into account the control of the fleet air arm by the RAF and the resultant debate over 
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the roles and relationship between the two Services.  Although if a pivotal role had been seen 
by the RN for aircraft in ASW this would have provided another strand in the RN’s argument 
for the return of control of aircraft supporting the fleet. 
Whilst most of the ASW research discussed was focused on protecting naval vessels, 
the biggest threat posed by the submarine in the First World War had been to merchant 
vessels and Britain’s supply lines.84  Although outside the scope of this thesis it should be 
noted that discussion over the protection of merchant vessels in time of war was conducted 
within a wider legal debate over their status.  There was a lack of international consensus 
over the legality of targeting merchant vessels and the extent of belligerent rights at sea.85     
Although not entirely concerned with protection against submarines, the main method of 
protecting merchant ships was the instigation of convoys.   Air power was seen as having a 
role to play but this was mainly in protection from enemy aircraft not enemy naval units.  
When pressed on this matter by the Secretary of State for Air, the First Lord of the Admiralty 
would reluctantly concede that the effect of a lack of air cover to a convoy would be to 
‘Perhaps…lose something’.86  Again a desire to promote the RN’s own agenda could be seen 
to triumph over an impartial military assessment. 
Within the RAF, the burgeoning discipline of ASW experienced a rapid descent into 
virtual obscurity after the end of the war.  The RAF ended the war with 37 ASW specific 
squadrons for use in home waters, a number which was to quickly decrease over the 
subsequent years.87  Coastal Area was formed in 1919 to encompass all maritime units of the 
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RAF but the forces under its control diminished to such a point that the 1929 figures list 
flights rather than squadrons of aircraft, with no ASW specific units included in the 
strength.88  This decline in maritime strength resulted from the policy laid down in the 
Trenchard Memorandum which proposed the structure for a peace time RAF.  This contains 
provision for only a ‘small part’ of the newly restructured force to work with the RN, and no 
provision for specific maritime tasks such as ASW.89  Even with the expansion programme 
for the RAF in the 1920s there was still no attempt to acquire ASW aircraft.90 
This decline must be viewed in the context of the contraction in size of all the military 
Services at this time.  Given the overall decline in the strength of the RAF significant 
decreases in maritime forces are unsurprising.  Of more significance is the proportional 
decrease in this type of capability.  The statistics show a massive shift in the relative strength 
of maritime aircraft in home waters from the immediate post-war position of numbering 
twice as many squadrons as bombers and fighters combined to 1929 whereby maritime 
consisted only one thirteenth the strength of the other two types.91  This shows a massive 
shift away from maritime operations by the RAF towards bombing, both in terms of bombers 
to attack an enemy as well as in later years fighter aircraft for both their protection and to 
defend against bomber attacks on Britain. 
This shift away from maritime operations has two main causes, firstly a shift in threat 
prioritisation and secondly the inter-Service debate over roles and responsibilities of the 
individual Services.  It can be seen that in the interwar years the bomber came to be seen as 
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the most significant aerial weapon, both from a military policy viewpoint and in terms of 
capturing the public imagination. Slessor described this as ‘an almost passionate faith in the 
efficacy of the bomber offensive as a major war-winning factor’.92   The increased allocation 
of resources to bombers as the main thread of Britain’s air power strategy was therefore 
perfectly logical to the RAF at the time. Given the financial constraints at this time as well as 
the constraints of industrial productive capacity, it was a virtual impossibility that increases 
in these aircraft types would not be at the expense of others such as maritime aircraft. 
The policy decisions discussed so far all took place against a tumultuous background 
of rivalry between the branches of the armed forces and for the RAF a struggle for continued 
existence.  There were on-going discussions as to how best to demarcate responsibility for 
the various aspects of the security of Britain and her Empire.93  These ranged over a variety 
of topics and took place at all levels from inter-Service discussion to questions in 
parliament.94  Although detailed examination of all aspects of the debate would be excessive, 
a précis serves to define the background that permitted the decline in the RAFs maritime 
forces.95  In broad terms, both the Army and RN felt the RAF should be subordinated to the 
senior Services’ control, that it was ‘a new arm and not a new service, and….must always be 
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directly subordinate’.96  Conversely the RAF wanted autonomy over all air power matters.97  
Several issues centred on the fight for control of Britain’s flying forces, such as the huge 
debate over the future of capital ships and their vulnerability to air attack, the relative merits 
of aircraft and coastal guns in terms of protecting ports and of greatest significance, the 
control of aircraft working with the RN.98  These led to numerous sub-committees 
investigating and reporting on each issue.99  Such reports if favourable to the RAF would 
often lead to scathing protests and retorts from both the Admiralty and the General Staff.  
Against such determined opposition, the Air Staff chose to champion capabilities and 
responsibilities for the fledgling air force which were more likely to find political favour. 
  In giving evidence to the Sub-committee on National and Imperial Defence, the 
Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) requested a specific question to be added as to ‘What assistance 
can the Air give to safeguard our mercantile marine …?’.100  The formal written answer 
states the exposure to ‘attack by submarine craft’ is still extant even under the provisions of 
the Washington Treaty, but then fails to expand on the possibility of the use of aircraft to 
counter this threat.  The rest of the response mentions briefly the lack of co-operation from 
the RN regarding formulation of a policy for air escort to counter potential attack by surface 
craft; it then focuses on the dangers of attack from the air in various theatres and possibility 
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of countering it.101  The answer is contextualised by CAS’s explicit statement of the intent to 
include this question in order to ‘bring forward the points we want to make’ with regard to a 
situation where aircraft were the only feasible method of defence.  It serves to highlight the 
extent to which RAF policy priorities were influenced by the need to ensure its own position 
and continued existence in the face of opposition from the other Services, rather than by 
military necessity.   
This links directly to the shift toward fighters and bombers already noted, based on a 
belief that ‘the effect of air attack in the future may…in itself…bring hostilities to an early 
and successful conclusion’.102  The importance attached to the threat of air attack and the 
continental air menace led to an expansion scheme for the RAF.103  This consisting entirely 
of bombers and fighters (along with supporting personnel and infrastructure), based on the 
fundamental assumption of the role of a first strike bombing raid the British battle plan.  The 
expansion aimed at achieving numerical parity with the foreign air forces felt most likely to 
threaten Britain at this time, with a particular focus on France.104 
Even within the newly formed Coastal Area there was little appetite for ASW, the 
main focus in the 1920s being on proving the worth of flying boats via long distance cruises 
around the Empire.105  These were successful in securing the funding for a small flying boat 
programme, based on the ability of such machines to deploy to remote parts of the Empire 
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with little supporting infrastructure coupled with the advantages of air power in tackling 
unrest more economically and speedily than ground troops.106  In this role the RAF was again 
keen to promote the need for flying boats to be in RAF control.107  The reliability and 
capabilities of flying boats improved through the 1920s, it is noteworthy however that the 
RAF still viewed ASW (usually in support of RN surface units) as only one small piece of 
the role of these machines and in no sense their main purpose.108  Coupled with the flexibility 
of deployment, advocates of flying boats focused on its wide ranging capabilities as being 
‘analogous to those of the bombers’ which were attracting significant funding at the time.109  
The flying boat therefore was championed as an exemplar of the diverse abilities offered by 
air power, not a specific ASW weapon.  As a 1926 staff college lecture indicates, the main 
view was that ASW was primarily the preserve of the RN and that whilst aircraft could be 
used to ‘locate and hold’ enemy submarines, it was best to use ‘surface ships to destroy’.110 
An earlier lecturer on this topic went even further suggesting the use of aircraft should 
prioritise aerial defence over ASW.111 
The decade following the First World War saw the decline into virtual obscurity of 
airborne ASW despite having played a significant part in winning the conflict.  In 1918, 
Geddes stated that ‘the responsibility for anti-submarine strategy must always rest with the 
                                                          
106 This had been shown in areas such as Iraq; see Montgomery-Hyde, British Air Policy, pp. 167-174. AIR 
5/449 ‘Equipment Policy of the Flying Boat Squadron Basra’ shows that the funding of this programme was 
still fought for by the Air Staff down to the level individual flights of machines, AIR 9/34 ‘Notes on CAS 
Address to Staff College Students’ dated 12 December 1928 states ‘C.A.S. indicated that it was his policy not to 
provide a large number of flying boats in the Service’. 
107 AIR 9/34 note to W/Cdr. Maycock dictated by CAS on 19 November 1926  
108 AIR 9/34 gives numerous reports on flying boat development from the late 1920s, for an indication of the 
progress see AIR 1/723/64/1/1, AIR 1/1881/204/221/22 and AIR 1/2397/267/5 for detail on flying boats in and 
immediately after the First World War, see also AIR 5/1144 ‘Air Staff Memorandum, No. 44 The Role of the 
Service Flying-Boat’ dated 1May 1929.  Within the Air Staff requirements for flying boats (ASM 44) ASW is 
only one of the roles envisaged 
109 AIR 9/34 ‘Duties and Employment of Flying Boat Squadrons’ 
110 AIR 9/34 ‘RAF Staff College Andover Lecture on Flying Boat Operations’ by Sqn Ldr Waugh dated 12th 
June 1928. 
111 AIR 1/2393/228/13/1 ‘RAF Staff College Lecture Aircraft vs. Submarine’ dated October 1924  
28 
 
Admiralty’.112  This view prevailed throughout the inter-war period, although there was some 
recognition within the RAF of the utility of aircraft in this role.  However, due to the on-
going conflict with the RN over control of aircraft, the RAF focused on achieving gains 
where they could be made and securing the independent future of air power.113 This was done 
by maximising on the growing interest in the potency of the bomber and advocating the 
financial benefits of flying boats for imperial policing.  There was no significant attempt to 
maintain or increase the ASW capability thus making ASW a victim of the wider discourse 
on the role of the RAF. Within the RN there was significant belief in the potential of sonar on 
surface ships and a reluctance to admit the potential benefits of aircraft as such machines 
were outside naval control. The net result was a near stasis in the development of airborne 
ASW as it was deprioritised to simply one of many roles for the flying boat. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
The Shift from Disarmament to Rearmament 
The subordination of military needs to economic restraints in defence policy reached 
its peak with the League of Nations Disarmament Conference at Geneva between 1932 and 
1934. Some of the criticism of Britain’s failure to promote security via this conference has 
been levelled at the focus on the intricacies of material disarmament, rather than the inter-
state political situation.114  Based largely on ever present financial pressures, combined with 
a somewhat idealistic approach to international security, the essence of Britain’s approach 
was to attempt to lead the way in the reduction and limitations of armaments.115  
  With regards to aircraft, disarmament was to fail in the face of opposition from other 
leading nations none of whom favoured disarmament.  There were two main reasons: the 
effect of the continual decline of Britain’s military strength over the previous years and the 
lack of a consensus of opinion on the best approach to the conference.116  Firstly the RAF had 
declined to such a point that the negotiating position was one of weakness, not strength, 
which was obvious to the other nations.117  Secondly, whilst a degree of common belief in 
disarmament prevailed amongst the British, there was a lack of consensus on the areas to be 
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focused on, leading to ultimate failure in achieving arms reduction.118  Proposals ranged from 
trying to limit specific aircraft types to the complete abolition of military aviation. Whilst 
some favoured abolishing bomber aircraft, others based their view on the concept that any 
aircraft was a potential bomber and went to the extreme of suggesting the removal of all 
military aviation and the internationalisation of civilian aviation to prevent its use for military 
purposes.119  Both these concepts found favour amongst the RN and the Army, doubtless 
seeing an opportunity to reassert their dominance in defence, whilst they raised passionate 
objections from the RAF.120  The debate amongst the British only widened over the course of 
the protracted conference. The abolition of bombers was ultimately rejected by the CID as 
possessing ‘considerable disadvantages from the point of view of imperial defence’, though 
the push for total abolition of military aviation continued.121  The draft convention for the 
Abolition of Military Aircraft and the Internationalization of Civil Aviation was defeated by 
a combination of domestic objections and pressures from other nations, notably France.122 
The push for air disarmament continued, however, in the form of more traditional treaties 
limiting arms.123  Whilst aircraft held central stage at the conference, there were also moves 
to continue in the vein of the Washington Treaty with further limitations to naval vessel 
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construction including submarines.124  Ultimately with the failure of the conference as a 
whole such ambitions were unfulfilled.125    
The withdrawal of Germany from proceedings marked the end of any hope of 
significant achievements for international security.126 This failure came in the shadow of a 
worsening international political dynamic in which Churchill’s warnings of Germany’s 
forthcoming ‘foreign adventure of the most dangerous and catastrophic character’ were 
increasingly gaining credibility.127  This was true not just amongst politicians concerned with 
the decline in international relations but also in the military analysis of the possible threat.128   
The effects of the Conference for Britain had been largely negative.  It had 
highlighted the growing fear of the effectiveness of the bomber, and cannot have failed to 
create a degree of ill feeling between the RAF and a government which the RAF felt had 
been prepared to sacrifice its very existence. Most significantly, unfulfilled hopes of 
disarmament had distracted attention from the growing military strength of other nations to 
such an extent that Britain found herself militarily weaker.  The indefinite adjournment of the 
Conference was followed by a fruitless search for alternatives to rearmament through pacts 
and treaties.129 However no practicable alternative was found and Britain was forced 
reluctantly to look towards rearmament.  The Conference period thus marks a watershed 
between the decline in military strength in the 1920s and the accelerated rearmament through 
the 1930s in the build-up to the Second World War. Whilst the need to rearm in the face of 
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growing foreign forces, especially Germany, had finally been conceded, the frictions  
between the Services regarding their defined roles would continue to be played out in the 
competition for the still limited funding, with negative implications for the already stagnant 
airborne ASW capability.  
 
Defence by Deterrence 
The failure of the disarmament conference and the worsening international situation 
forced a review of Britain’s defence posture, specifically the capability shortfalls 
accumulated under the ten year rule; this was conducted by the Defence Requirements 
Committee (DRC) in 1933.130   The submissions put before the DRC almost suggest 
disinclination towards rearmament from the Air Ministry. The initial RAF proposal was 
merely a continuation to completion of the expansion to 52 squadrons which had been halted 
pending the outcome of the Geneva conference.131   The DRC report acknowledged the 
precariousness of Britain’s position and recommended a programme to address these 
deficiencies.  The threat from Germany acquiring submarines was considered significant. 
However, plans to counter it were initially limited to mooting the potential requirement to 
equip some auxiliary naval vessels for ASW.132  The DRC report was ultimately toothless in 
terms of airborne ASW.  There was acknowledgement for the need for aircraft for ASW in 
home waters.  Although commended to the cabinet for special attention, this is not considered 
significant enough to warrant a recommendation for investment in the report itself.133      
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At a ministerial level there was a significant shift of focus from imperial defence to 
the European theatre especially the potential threat from Germany via bombing.  The 
recommendations of the DRC for the RAF were seen as inadequate and a specially appointed 
sub-committee directed the preparation of a programme for greater expansion.  The directive 
required CAS to pay ‘particular attention to achieving the maximum deterrent effect’.134  The 
resultant programme was the first of a series of alphabetically designated expansion schemes, 
several of which never came to fruition due to constant revisions, driven by a desire to form 
an effective deterrence against Germany.  Through the expansion process the proposals of the 
Air Ministry were not necessarily accepted, mirroring the ministerial rejection of the original 
DRC recommendations as inadequate, 1935 saw the formation of an Air Parity sub-
committee to improve on the Air Ministries propositions.  Deterrence through parity became 
the bedrock of defence policy, and effective deterrence naturally required large increases in 
the number of bombers.135  As would be expected the increased bomber striking capability 
was accompanied by an increase in air defence provisions.136  Whilst it can be claimed that 
parity with potential enemies had long been part of British defence policy, the situation had 
now shifted such that the government was prepared to fund achieving it for the RAF.137 The 
constant reactions to estimates of German aviation capabilities, generated considerable 
debate as to exactly what parity meant and how it could be measured.  Seeking to match 
numbers of aircraft and squadrons was ineffective and there was considerable discussion as 
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to how to assess the actual relative striking capability of the RAF.138  It can be seen therefore 
that despite the widespread acceptance of the parity goal, there was a lack of an effective 
measure for its achievement.  This is indicative of the short comings of this approach as an 
effective defence policy. 
The RAF’s growth in the 1930s owed more to the actions of government committees 
than to the Air Ministry and senior officers; hence, it was the desire amongst politicians for a 
powerful bomber force which directed the focus of the expansion.  However the Air Ministry 
did shape the details of the expansion schemes such that Coastal Area was not totally ignored 
and achieved some limited growth, though it was only a fraction of that of the bomber and 
fighter forces.139  Whilst it can be argued that action at a ministerial level led to reliance on 
the bomber force as the key tenet of defence policy, the near-religious belief in the potential 
of this weapon was also the bedrock of thinking at senior levels within the RAF.140 It was the 
supreme faith in this specific capability that proved to be the single biggest factor in 
stymieing development of appropriate ASW aircraft. A 1933 note from CAS highlights this, 
arguing against relying on fighters as the sole defence of London.  Much emphasis is placed 
on the dangers presented by submarines to the supply of food.  However, it makes no 
mention of the potential of maritime aircraft, instead arguing solely for ‘the vital necessity for 
offensive bombing aircraft’.141 
In reviewing the growth achieved, the challenge echoes that facing those questing for 
air parity in the 1930s, namely that squadron and airframe numbers do not provide a full 
account of military capability.  Costs vary between aircraft types and the allocations made for 
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the growth of maritime forces in the expansion schemes were split between land based 
aircraft and flying boats.142  The landplane received a greater share of the increase in 
maritime forces.  There are two logical motivations for this; firstly, land based aircraft were 
considerably cheaper, hence a greater increase in numbers could be achieved at less cost.  
Secondly, land based aircraft were more easily re-roled to other tasks.  This had specific 
negative consequences for ASW, in that the shorter range of the land based aircraft compared 
to the larger flying boats limited their use.  Those flying boats provided by the expansion 
scheme were of limited range; the effect of this oversight would become apparent in the early 
stages of the Second World War with the emergence of the Atlantic Gap.143  In critiquing the 
expansion schemes, it should be noted that they were reflective of the higher level thinking in 
defence and served the purpose for which they were designed. Both the land based aircraft 
and flying boats allocated to coastal area were originally designated as general purpose 
squadrons, later changed to general reconnaissance squadrons, giving a clear indication of 
their intended use: to augment other capabilities, rather than provide a specific ASW 
capability.144  This theme is continued through the later expansion schemes, whereby the 
increase in general reconnaissance squadrons was altered to a type of aircraft that would have 
a dual role use as a bomber; this had a double effect of increasing the strength of that force as 
well as reducing the costs associated with operating multiple aircraft types.145  The increases 
in aircraft numbers during the expansion schemes do not, however, give a full picture of the 
relative growth of maritime air power.  Once allocated by the expansion schemes, the new 
aircraft would then have to be procured.  Having won a share of the financial allocation, 
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Coastal Command would again compete with other areas of the RAF for allocation of 
productive capacity.146  This often resulted in a lower priority for the building of maritime 
aircraft compared to bombers and fighters.147  
Along with aircraft strength, the other principal factor in determining the 
effectiveness of air power in the ASW role is the ability to prosecute a target, once detected.  
The main munition at this time was the anti-submarine bomb; this had performed poorly 
during the First World War and was the object of development in the interwar period.148  As 
with other aspects of maritime air power, funding was inadequate, resulting in deficient 
bombs, bomb sights and bomb release equipment with limited effectiveness.149  In direct 
contrast to the positive role technology played in shaping RN ASW policy via ASDIC, the 
lack of effective ASW weapons for the RAF created a technological shortfall to further 
restrict the development of an effective airborne ASW capability. 
The large size increase from the expansion schemes led to a functionally orientated 
organisational restructure such that in 1936 Coastal Area became Coastal Command and 
Fighter and Bomber Commands were also created.150  The shift to Commands was intended 
to provide a structure capable of utilising the increased number of aircraft, as well as to 
deconflict the demands of both an offensive and defensive force.  The inclusion of coastal 
forces in the reorganisation was not, however, indicative of equal status.   Given that the 
main task of Coastal Command was co-operation with the geographically structured RN, the 
                                                          
146 CAB 16/123 Minutes of Interdepartmental meeting held on 6 February 1936 discussing industrial production 
give an indication of some of the problems with the massive increase in British industrial output required by the 
expansions schemes. 
147 See Hendrie, Cinderella Service, pp. 25-46 for more detail on maritime aircraft procurement. Although 
taking the procurement of fighter and bomber aircraft as its subject C. Sinnott, The Royal Air Force and Aircraft 
Design 1923-1939, (London: Frank Cass, 2001) gives a useful overview of the procurement process.  
148 AIR 41/81 Armament Vol. One Bombs and Bombing Equipment 1952 pp. 30-38, 275-312, provides a 
narrative of anti-submarine bomb development. 
149 Price, Aircraft vs. Submarine, pp. 34-35, Hendrie, Cinderella Service, pp. 47-59 
150 Expansion scheme C led to the formation of the Commands structure see AIR 8/249 Comparative Table of 
RAF Expansion Schemes, AIR 2/8877 gives detail of the conference held to discuss the restructure,  
37 
 
system enforced by the new Commands structure was far from ideal.  Coastal Command was 
not of sufficient size to form a Group to correspond to each of the local RN commands, and 
its inability to match its own command structure with that of the RN would prove detrimental 
to their co-operation.151  Despite an appreciation of these issues at the highest levels in the 
RAF, the new structure was still introduced.152  The adherence to this inappropriate structure 
shows another way in which needs of the maritime forces were subjugated to those of the 
fighter and bomber. Not until 1939, once the ineffectiveness of this system had been proven 
in joint exercises, would a fit-for-purpose, geographically based Group structure be 
introduced, which would remain for the duration of the Second World War.153 
Reports on the growth of German aviation were matched by those on the increase of 
the German navy, including submarines. The DRC’s report acknowledged this, pairing 
submarines with aircraft as ‘The greatest potential threat’.154 The view of ASW as primarily a 
RN responsibility prevailed and this was reflected in the allocation of funds to the RN for 
ASW by the DRC.  The same ministerial committee which rejected the DRC proposal for the 
RAF as too small would take the opposite view in the case of the RN and cut the sums 
allocated.155  For their part the RN still placed all its faith in ASDIC as having largely 
nullified the submarine threat.156  This was despite the fact that it was still a relatively new 
technology and relied on a suitably equipped vessel being in close proximity to the 
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submarine.157 It is a measure of the level of faith in this technology that in the preliminary 
meetings for the London Naval Conference of 1935-6 the British were willing to accept 
numerical equality in submarines with Germany.158  The RN’s overconfidence is also evident 
in its failure to conduct effective ASW exercises in the interwar period.159 This self-deception 
by the Admiralty bordered on negligence given the evidence from a live action in the 
Mediterranean during the Spanish Civil War where ASDIC failed to perform satisfactorily.160  
As previously noted, RN policy for the use aircraft in ASW was based around 
reconnaissance; this was to prove of greatest benefit when used in conjunction with convoys. 
Despite internal debate within the RN, convoys were ultimately considered ‘the most 
effective form of protection against surface, submarine or air attack’.161   Even in the face of 
suggestions to the contrary, much planning was put into place for the instigation of convoys 
at the outbreak of war.162 Though some exercises were conducted during the 1930s, the use 
of military ships in lieu of merchant vessels and the skewing of such exercises away from 
reality to maximise training benefits reduced the development of useful joint tactics in this 
area.163  The lack of inclusion of maritime aircraft in the planning for an effective convoy 
system was yet another factor in retarding the development of ASW aircraft.   
Interest in maritime air power within the RN lay mainly in regaining control of it.  RN 
officers held syndicate discussions and provided summary reports on the ‘Potential for Flying 
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Boats in Naval Operations’ during 1931/2.164 The reports of this investigation show a 
reasonable spread of opinions on the potential for these aircraft in ASW.  Several reports 
acknowledged the threat from submarine and the potential of the flying boat as ‘probably the 
greatest antidote’.165  Summaries provided by senior officers, however, viewed flying boats 
as of limited use due to their inability to fulfil the same ASW role as surface craft.166 Thus, at 
the senior level, capable of influencing policy, the main role of aircraft is still seen as 
supportive reconnaissance, expressed in the view that it was ‘more than doubtful if flying 
boats unaided, will ever be able to destroy or neutralize hostile forces (whatever their nature) 
employed in the attack on trade’.167  Attention was firmly focused on who controlled 
maritime aircraft, both land-based and flying boats, rather than the potential benefits of their 
employment.  The decision was made not to pursue the inflammatory issue of control of 
flying boats, presumably to maintain the focus of deliberations with the Air Ministry firmly 
on the topic of the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) as a whole.168    
Overall the RN was eager to champion the advantages of carrier aircraft, over flying 
boats in trade defence roles.169 Again these suggestions of the innate benefits of carrier 
aviation reflected the RN’s on-going desire to regain control of the FAA. This was to be a 
major theme in RN thinking on aviation, and competition between the two Services reached a 
point whereby a specific inquiry was set up into maritime aviation.170 This would ultimately 
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return control of the FAA to the RN whilst leaving coastal forces within the RAF.171 
Naturally this was opposed by the RAF who, abiding by their belief in the unity of command 
of air power, lobbied to retain control of all maritime aviation.172  The RAF was equally 
guilty of prioritising the control of resources over their effective use.  Correspondence 
predating the culmination of the naval aviation controversy suggests a plan to use flying 
boats for non-maritime tasks for the sole purpose of strengthening the argument for keeping 
them under RAF control.173  For airborne ASW, this was of relatively little consequence as 
neither the RN nor the RAF had been promoting the use of aircraft in this role.  The RN 
mirrored the general preoccupation with the threat of air attack and its main aim in increasing 
the FAA was to provide the fleet with protection against such attacks.174  
The theme of concern over the control rather than the potential use of assets continued 
in attitudes to ASW throughout the 1930s.  Two concurrent staff papers from both the RN 
and RAF on the use of aircraft in trade defence serve to encapsulate this view.175  The RN 
paper places its focus on the role for aircraft in ASW as being in supporting their own 
ASDIC vessels as the main thrust of any ASW campaign.  The fact that the paper was filed in 
an Admiralty dossier concerned with regaining control of the FAA highlights the view of 
airborne ASW as simply a support to the RN’s case for control of maritime aviation rather 
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than a capability to be developed.176   The bulk of the RAF paper sought to emphasise air 
attack as the primary threat and one which could only be effectively countered by aircraft.   
The RAF response, both in critiquing the RN paper and drafting its own, aimed to play down 
the submarine threat in light of the ‘improvements in naval equipment’, and to advocate the 
effectiveness of bomber aircraft.177 It proposed the use of long range bombers against the 
ports and shipyards supporting submarines, an approach which had been employed with little 
success during the First World War.178  Airborne ASW was thus marginalised in the early 
surge for rearmament.  Furthermore the gains made by the Coastal force did not remedy the 
deficiencies accumulated under the austerity of the 1920s.   This failure to develop resulted 
from the faith of the RN in its own new technologies, the RAF belief in and focus on 
bombing, and the interactions between the Services which focused on control of resources to 
the detriment of development of capabilities. 
 
The Dash for Defensive Rearmament 
Focus on deterrence, through possession of the ability to deliver a dramatic short term 
bomber offensive, continued as the cornerstone of a policy of ‘adequate deterrence to 
Germany’.179 The Ministerial Committee, which had rejected the DRC’s initial 
recommendations, was surpassed by the Defence Policy and Requirements Sub-Committee in 
1935, though the perceived shortcomings in Britain’s defensive capabilities were such that its 
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work was subject to revision at Cabinet level.180  Such was the clamour to rectify the 
cumulative deficiencies in Britain’s military that there were now three committees providing 
policy papers to the cabinet in addition to a Ministerial position specifically charged with co-
ordinating defence.181  The ineffectiveness of the quest for air parity caused considerable 
anxiety on security issues, as by the late 1930s financial pressures had made the number of 
aircraft required unaffordable. Coupled with the expansion of the German forces, this led to a 
reappraisal of fundamental British defence planning assumptions, led by the Minister for Co-
ordination of Defence, Sir Thomas Inskip in 1937.182  This moved the focus for the RAF 
away from decisive strikes to a more balanced approach with an increased focus on defensive 
capabilities.183  Inskip’s recommendations shifted the emphasis of the continuing expansion 
programmes.184 
The developing threat of a conflict in Europe forced increasingly pragmatic appraisals 
of defence requirements as rearmament gained momentum.185  Germany’s U-boat capability 
was no longer the object of theoretical intelligence speculation, but a very real and 
acknowledged threat.186  The fundamental tenet of the new approach heralded by Inskip's 
reappraisals of defence needs was that a future conflict would not be won by short term 
decisive striking actions, but over a protracted period combining striking force with 
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economic pressure.187  Implicit in this was Britain’s need to maintain her fighting 
effectiveness over a long period; in terms of a European centred conflict, this placed huge 
importance on her SLOCs.  Their vulnerability to submarine attack had been well established 
in the First World War, as had the Germany’s willingness to conduct an unrestricted 
submarine campaign, it was assumed this would feature from the outset of any future war.188 
This increased acknowledgement of the threat did not, however, result in a shift in policy 
with regard to trade defence; instead, the RN belief in ASDIC to ‘rob[s] them of their chief 
advantage…and profoundly affect a future submarine campaign’ prevailed.189  There was, 
however, an acceptance of ‘the possibility of losses from submarine attack’ whilst this force 
was bought up to strength in the opening stages of a war.190 
The increasingly sharp focus on the need to protect the SLOCs could have potentially 
afforded the RAF, which was considered to be ‘a very high if not first priority’, a second 
opportunity to mould a more balanced structure for the anticipated conflict.191  However, 
discussion concerning Trade Defence Squadrons did not result in significant increases in the 
strength of coastal command, nor were the gains made in bespoke maritime aircraft.192 In line 
with the prevailing attitudes regarding strategic bombing the main advantage of the increases 
in strength of the General Reconnaissance aircraft was seen in the Air Staff as a gain in the 
‘number of additional potential bombers’.193 This view of the potential use of Coastal aircraft 
in support of the air offensive came to dominate in Coastal Command, with naval co-
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operation in coastal defence in a secondary position and trade defence only forming a very 
small portion of its role.194  Hence one of the two war roles for Coastal Command was ‘Co-
operation with the Bomber Command in the Main Strategical Air Offensive’, although in 
laying down these roles there is considerable criticism of the lack of direction from the 
Admiralty.195 Ultimately as war loomed closer there was a realisation that the focus on a 
bombing role for Coastal Command was at risk of negating its existence, and inhibited the 
organisation of any effective structure for a wartime maritime force.196  As late as 1938 there 
was ‘no clear cut picture of what is expected of aircraft co-operating with the A/S surface 
craft’.197  The renewed emphasis on trade protection led to a series of conferences and 
exercises with the RN and RAF redefining Coastal Command’s war role.198    
Despite year of sometimes frenzied rearmament, outbreak of war found airborne 
ASW still a poorly armed reconnaissance platform, virtually undeveloped in real terms since 
the First World War.199 At a political level, blame can be levelled at the myopic attitudes of 
faith in single capabilities; ASDIC to negate the submarine threat and bombers which it was 
widely believed by all politicians would provide the foundation of victory in a future conflict.  
These attitudes were the result of the expert advice of the Service chiefs; hence the lion’s 
share of responsibility for the lamentable state of airborne ASW in 1939 must be laid at their 
door. If the status of air power in ASW had remained static through the interwar period some 
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of the reasons behind this at a Service level shifted over the 21 years between the conflicts.  
The RN faith in ASDIC as a definitive ASW solution capable of ensuring that the submarine 
would ‘never…be a fatal menace again’ was consistent, despite being unproven in a conflict 
scenario.200  RN reluctance to explore the role of aircraft in ASW also remained consistent, 
due to their rivalry with the RAF for control of maritime air power.  RN focus remained on 
the surface threat to commerce the defence against which they saw being aided by aircraft in 
a reconnaissance role.201  The RN approach was aided by the RAF’s acceptance of their 
responsibility for ASW. It is in the motivations for this that we see a change over the period. 
In the initial period of austerity and the era of the disarmament conference, the RAF focused 
on its own continued existence through promoting the most politically popular capability 
type, bombers, rather than the development of its potential capabilities in other areas.  In the 
rearmament period the potential to develop airborne ASW was affected less by inter-Service 
rivalry; however, internal conflict within the RAF, again with those championing bombing 
capability, continued to stymie the development of ASW.  Within the RAF, this led to a 
limited numerical expansion of the maritime arm, ensuring that new aircraft were procured 
with an eye for potential use in an offensive bomber role.  The ‘variegated air policy’ of the 
interwar years, despite its numerous shifts ranging from total disarmament to urgent 
rearmament, was always focused on bomber and to a lesser extent fighter capabilities.202  
Thus, the RAF squandered the opportunity to develop an effective ASW force during the 
expansion period.203 Whilst the RN and the RAF contributed in different ways to the lack of 
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effective airborne ASW policy, the actions of both were rooted in the same institutional 
culture, namely the inability and unwillingness to work outside their natural sphere of 
operations.  For the RN this resulted in the subsurface threat being seen as a distinctly naval 
problem and as such it required a naval solution.  In the same vein when the RAF assessed its 
potential role in trade defence, it focused on the air threat to SLOCs, seeing an air problem 
necessitating an air solution.  Both Services were thus limited by their own organisational 
cultures in their ability to think in joint terms. They failed to appreciate the potential of 
tackling the threat in one operational environment from a capability in another, thus the 
potential of air power in ASW remained underdeveloped in the interwar period, lost in the 
scramble for rearmament. 
The final days of peace did yield recognition of the future ASW role of aircraft in 
some circles.204  There was joint training of the RAF with the RN ASW School, a detailed 
RN minute regarding ASW, and serious RAF effort in devising air ASW tactics.205 This was 
definitely a case of too little too late, with the RAF and RN discussing the ideal 
characteristics for ASW aircraft less than nine months before the outbreak of war.206  The 
source of this this eleventh hour epiphany is unclear, but unfortunately it does not seem to be 
indicative of a progression in inter-Service relations, as indicated by a Plans memorandum 
that the motivation for developing ASW capability was the fear that 
‘When the history of the next War is written…we shall be told that the Air Ministry 
could not meet the submarine menace and the F.A.A. had to come to the rescue!’207 
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Regardless of motivation, this late push for an ASW capability mostly at a tactical level and 
incapable of producing a significant shift in policy before the outbreak of war. Given the lead 
time in aircraft procurement and the complexity of arranging joint exercises with an 
underdeveloped system of co-operation it would make little difference in the readiness of 
Britain to defend her SLOCs at the outbreak of hostilities with Germany, though it did serve 
to point towards the future of ASW. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Test of Battle 
The bombing campaigns which had been at the centre of interwar policy-setting were 
slow to become effective during the Second World War.208  Contrastingly, the war against 
seaborne trade began instantaneously, with the sinking of Anthenia on the day of Britain’s 
declaration of war.209 The first blow by Coastal Command followed two days later, with an 
attack against a surfaced submarine off the Scottish coast.210  The attack consisted of the 
British aircrew misidentified a RN submarine as hostile and attacked it with A/S bombs; 
although causing no damage to the vessel, the bombs severely damaged the attacking aircraft, 
forcing it to ditch. This was not an isolated incident.  Whilst the misidentification indicated a 
lack of crew training; self-inflicted bomb damage was a common problem owing to the 
inadequacies of the weapon and the lack of a suitable bomb sight, one of the major threads of 
the lack of preparedness of Britain’s airborne ASW forces. The fact that despite consistent 
sightings by Coastal Command aircraft the first U-boat kill by an aircraft was achieved by a 
Bomber Command crew in January 1940 using general purpose bombs again shows the 
inability of Coastal Command to conduct effect ASW operations at this point. 211 
The narrative of the Battle of the Atlantic has been recounted in detail elsewhere but a 
brief overview of the salient facts is necessary to define those aspects which directly resulted 
from policy decisions.212 The conflict can be viewed in two distinct phases: initial German 
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domination before the Allies gained the upper hand, culminating in Allied victory with the 
withdrawal of the U-boats from the Atlantic in 1943.  The early phase saw the Germans 
exploit their ability to expand their U-boat fleet at a far greater relative rate than Britain’s 
ASW forces.213  This, combined with shorter transit routes offered by the ports gained with 
the fall of France, and Coastal Command’s inability to operate in the centre of the Atlantic, 
allowed them to inflict severe losses on Allied shipping.214  The balance ultimately swung in 
Britain’s favour; from having been forced to revert to First World War scarecrow tactics in 
1939 in a bid to provide deterrence, Coastal Command made significant gains in aircraft both 
in type and quantity, especially after the Battle of Britain. This, combined with the 
exploitation of new technologies and intelligence sources, allowed a successful aggressive 
ASW campaign from 1942 onwards.  Had the war continued, it is possible that the German 
navy would have returned to the Atlantic with new U-boat designs.215  
From an air power perspective, the result of the Battle of the Atlantic was determined 
by four main factors: the use of signals intelligence, the effective control of Coastal 
Command and its co-operation with the RN, the provision of suitable resources and the 
development of new technologies.   With regard to signals intelligence, this was ‘the most 
important source of information for the Allies on the activities of German U-boats’.216 The 
interception of signals traffic allowed the plotting of likely positions for U-boats, which could 
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then be used to re-route convoys accordingly.217  Intelligence, however, was an area with its 
own policy paradigm, centred mainly on its effective exploitation whilst protecting its 
sources.218  Once collected, intelligence is not usually the subject of competition from 
differing sections of the military in the same way other resources are; debate over its use is 
normally centred on the advantage gained against the risk of revealing the source.  Thus, 
further examination of this area will provide little illumination on the role of RN and RAF in 
ASW policy.   However, the other factors were all debated at the policy level, a debate 
impassioned by the consequences of shipping losses and the effects of the disruption to 
Britain’s supply lines, as such they are worthy of individual consideration.              
A constant thread among these factors is the level of priority afforded to ASW as part 
of trade defence within the overall war effort.  At the opening of the conflict, Coastal 
Command was in a weak position regarding its aircraft types and strength, and had still not 
achieved the modest targets set for it.219  The outbreak of War bought a swift change in the 
control of the armed forces with the establishment of the War Cabinet; this, however failed to 
solve the conflicts over resources which had dominated the interwar period.220  For airborne 
ASW, this meant a continuation of the conflict within the RAF itself mainly between Coastal 
and Bomber Commands, specifically for radar sets and very long range aircraft. 
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The Naval Aviation Controversy Revisited 
One of the earliest effects of the priority battle on policy was to reopen the debate on 
the control of maritime air power. The RN realised relatively early in the conflict that the war 
against the U-boats was not maturing as anticipated.  The opening months of the conflict had 
shown the limitations of ASDIC due to the relatively small number of vessels available and 
the inherent limits of speed and range of surface craft.221 Meanwhile the natural advantages 
of air power in an ASW role were quick to emerge.  Simultaneously, the disadvantages of 
carrier aviation on which so much emphasis had previously been placed became apparent, 
with the loss of the Courageous and near loss of the Ark Royal in September 1939.222 This 
was compounded by the RN being badly overstretched operating across several theatres such 
that, by 1940 they were looking to land-based aircraft and flying boats to provide an air 
solution to the traditionally naval problem.223 
This effectively pitched them into the internal RAF / Air Ministry battle over 
resources as the RN demanded more aircraft for ASW.224  This was discussed by the War 
Cabinet with the RN asserting Coastal Command’s ‘Cinderella’ status due to the denial of 
resources by the Air Ministry; however, the debate skewed to one on the control of Coastal 
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Command rather than the pressing issue of aircraft shortages.225  In direct contrast to the 
control battles of the 1930s, the RN was focused, in the short term at least, on the provision 
on additional ASW capability whilst Lord Beaverbrook, Minister for Aircraft Production was 
advocating transferal of maritime aircraft to the RN.226  Throughout CAS’s contribution to 
the debate seems motivated by the traditional desire to defend the integrity of the RAF.227  
Now with the imperative of defending Britain’s SLOCs, it was the ministers rather 
than military officers who were pushing the issues of control to the fore, to the detriment of 
addressing the pressing capability deficit. The result was an inquiry ordered by Churchill into 
the control of Coastal Command, aimed at increasing the effectiveness of air power in trade 
defence.228  The need to conduct such an inquiry, which could only serve to detract from the 
main effort of conducting the War, shows the negative ramifications of Coastal Command’s 
on-going fight for resources within the RAF.   The impetus of the debate was largely 
removed by the allocation of more aircraft to Coastal in accordance with the Admiralty’s 
wishes.229  The eventual result of the inquiry was the decision by the Defence Committee to 
transfer operational control of Coastal Command to the RN, although it would still remain 
part of the RAF.230  Superficially, this appears to be a bold shift in policy to the benefit of the 
use of air power in the ASW campaign.  The net effect, however, was negligible, as to all 
intents and purposes the RN already had operational control for the duration of the conflict, 
the Commander in Chief Coastal Command reporting that this decision ‘made little 
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difference to… [the]…existing close co-operation… [which]…remained unchanged'.231  
Whilst inter-Service conflict motivated by maintenance of status was responsible for the 
shortfalls in ASW aircraft at the outbreak of the War, faced with mounting a campaign 
against the German U-boats the RN and RAF seemed largely able to put such rivalries aside.  
They were able to co-operate effectively at a Command level, with the naval personnel 
embedded within Coastal Command widely acknowledged as having been critical in the 
conduct of the ASW campaign.232   At the ministerial level however the vestiges of such 
attitudes prevailed, producing an inquiry which in addition to being an unwelcome distraction 
produced a decision of little real consequence.  More significantly, it failed to address the 
underlying issue of the shortcomings in aircraft for ASW, the concessions made only proving 
a stopgap solution to the problem.  While the interwar period can be characterised by the lack 
of a policy for the use of air power in ASW, this first attempt to address this policy shortfall, 
motivated by the prevailing operational situation, failed to have a significant impact. 
 
Technological and Tactical Leapfrogging 
 Technology was a significant component of the British campaign against the U-boats; 
technological and complementary tactical developments were fundamental in deciding the 
Battle of the Atlantic.  In contrast to the pre-war development of ASDIC, which formed a 
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tactical paper produced by the naval officers at Coastal Command, being used by the Commander in Chief; see 
also V. Orange, Slessor: Bomber Champion, (London: Grub Street, 2006), pp. 102-104 and Slessor, Central 
Blue, p. 486 for his praise of the work of these individuals. This is all the more significant as there were often 
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significant strand in shaping and defining ASW policy, the wartime policy shift to the use of 
air power in ASW devoted more resources to the development of equipment required to 
counter the U-boats from the air. The tactical battle pitched convoys against wolf packs, with 
the use of radio direction finders to locate U-boat groups and constant shifts in the U-boat 
areas of operations in response to the range and coverage of Coastal Command’s aircraft.233 
Later the German snorkel was developed aimed at reducing detectability whilst a U-boat was 
recharging its batteries whilst the British began the development of sonobuoys.234 
Technological advances came in both the detection and prosecution of targets.  In detection, 
one of the most significant steps was the airborne maritime search radar termed Aircraft-to-
Surface Vessel, which led the Germans to develop radar detector devices.  There was a 
constant shift in advantage in this battle to dominate the electromagnetic spectrum; the 
British changed to new frequencies while the Germans attempted to develop detection 
equipment amidst fears that the detectors themselves were giving off spurious emissions, 
giving away the U-boats’ positions.235  The Leigh Light allowed the exploitation of radar 
detection to successfully attack U-boats, which reduced the relative immunity to air attack 
that U-boats had been enjoying in darkness.236  In terms of target prosecution, the ineffective 
anti-submarine bomb gave way to the aerial depth charge, initially modified naval charges, 
                                                          
233 Price, Aircraft vs. Submarine, pp. 104-105, 133-136. 
234 AIR 15/454 gives detail on initial discovery of and attempts to counter the 'Schnorkle' see also AIR 41/74 
AHB Narrative The RAF in Maritime War Vol. 5, Appendix V, for details on the difficulties posed by the 
snorkel. AIR 15/426-7 gives details on the development and trials of sonobuoys. 
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and then a more bespoke design.237  This allowed aircraft to move from detection and 
deterrence to a meaningful attack capability.238    
 Britain’s ability to maintain pace in the technological conflict resulted from a 
conscious policy for development and exploitation of new technologies, largely achieved 
through the work of the Operational Research Section (ORS).239  This had originated from 
the various technical organisations dealing with the problem of defence against air attack 
prior to the War before becoming formalised as part of Fighter Command.240  Coastal 
Command was able to benefit from the intellectual capital of another section, as the 
successful model of Fighter Command’s ORS was copied, principally to promote the 
development of radar.241  From this initial tasking, the ORS went on to tackle challenges as 
diverse as aircraft camouflage schemes for working over the sea and optimum depth charge 
settings and attack patterns.242 
The positive policy for technology was not limited to the formations of the ORS. The 
selection of Air Chief Marshal Sir Philip Joubert de la Ferte to take charge of Coastal 
Command was influenced by his perceived ability to lever his previous technical experience 
to address the use of radar within the command.243   Joubert de la Ferte had previously been 
heavily involved in the appointment of a scientific advisor to Coastal Command, a precursor 
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to the formation of the ORS.244    Policy for technological advancement permeated through 
the Command itself, the Leigh Light being the result of an internal request for suggestions for 
solutions to the difficulties of night attacks.245 Despite the success of this policy in producing 
technological innovations, the implementation of such advances proved more problematic 
thanks to the continual issue of resource allocation.  In this instance, the problem lay in 
competition for specific pieces of equipment, such as radar sets and their sub-components, 
which also had uses for other Commands.  This was especially true with the later 
development of centimetric radar, on which Fighter Command had first call for use in air 
defence fighters.246 Once the priority afforded by the Battle of Britain and the London Blitz 
had passed, Coastal Command was still in competition with Bomber Command, who 
required the new radar for use in their pathfinder force.247 Direct communication between the 
two Commanders in Chief regarding their requirements was ineffective with neither willing 
to compromise, Harris being particularly belligerent due to his poor opinion of the relevance 
of Coastal Command to the conduct of the War.248 The Air Ministry was to decide the matter 
and this proved a rare example of Coastal Command gaining the upper hand, as it received 
the radar sets at the expense of Bomber Command.249  However, by January 1943 priority 
had swung back to Bomber Command.  It is noteworthy that the language of the report 
suggesting the reprioritisation of Bomber Command referred to an instruction from CAS to 
be informed if ‘at any time it appears that the effort required to help Coastal Command was 
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246 Price, Aircraft vs. Submarine,  p. 53, 98-99 
247 AIR 15/109 letter from AOC-in-C Bomber Command to AOC-in-C Coastal Command dated 19 September 
1942 described the H.2.S. Radar as ‘At the head of the list of essential equipment‘. 
248 AIR 15/109 correspondence between AOC-in-C Coastal Command and AOC-in-C Bomber Command 
September 1942 
249 AIR 20/1060 ‘Minutes of the Meeting held at 11:30 a.m., 30.9.42 at Oakwood Court, to consider the 
production of H. 2. S. Equipment for both Bomber Command and Coastal Command requirements’ 
57 
 
affecting Bomber Command in too adverse a manner’, indicating a deep seated priority for 
the latter at the highest levels of the RAF.250 
A further issue with the radar was the timing of the release to service of new 
centimetric frequency equipment; this was due to fears that its use by Bomber Command 
would quickly result in German access to the equipment from a downed aircraft. This would 
affect the ASW campaign, as it would allow for the development of new radar detectors for 
U-boats, removing the advantages gained by the frequency shift.  It is noteworthy that the 
main concern over this was within the Admiralty rather than the RAF, indicating the growing 
trend for the RN to be the prime supporter of the use of aircraft in the ASW role.251  
Ultimately the matter was decided personally by Churchill in Bomber Command’s favour, 
allowing early operational release of the centimetric radar sets, though the same situation was 
to occur the following year with the 3cm frequency radars. 252 
Whilst, aircraft apart, radar is the most significant example of competition between 
Commands over technological resources, it was by no means a unique issue.  Competition 
over items ranged from explosives for depth charges to bomb sights; attempts to procure such 
equipment were always against a background of rivalry with other commands.253 
 In the technological field, there was some policy success for ASW. This was, 
however, stunted by the constant fight for the necessary resources to translate the 
technological innovations into kinetic effect in operations. Ultimately much of the 
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technological policy success in development was at the command level and required a higher 
level policy shift to realise its potential. 
 
Aircraft Allocation 
 The most significant area of resource competition was undoubtedly for aircraft, which 
continued throughout the course of the war.  The evident potential of aircraft in the ASW role 
resulted in some additional allocation due to pressure from the RN in the midst of the 
operational control debate already described.254  This was, however, only a short-term 
solution, as the losses to U-boats continued.  It is a measure of the pressure on Coastal 
Command that to bolster its ability to fulfil trade protection role some of its tasks were aided 
by resources from both Bomber and Fighter Commands.255  Despite these attempts to 
alleviate the pressure, Coastal Command itself felt that its requirements were consistently 
neglected; ‘Bomber Command always won, though a few crumbs would be thrown to 
coastal’.256  Though this comment is obviously coloured with Command bias, there are 
numerous suggestions elsewhere that the primarily defensive nature of maritime operations 
rated second in most opinions to the offensive bombing campaigns; Churchill was a leading 
supporter of this view, being ‘reluctant to weaken the most powerful offensive weapon’ 
Britain had.257 
                                                          
254 AIR 15/773 Despatches on the operations of Coastal Command Royal Air force p. 35 paragraph 167 
255 AIR 15/19 letters dated 28 February 1941. AIR 15/19 correspondence between Coastal and Bomber 
Commands and the Air Ministry 22 February 1941- 25 March 1941 shows the return of loan aircraft from 
Bomber Command for anti-invasion patrols was the subject of some disagreement between the two 
Commanders in Chief see also AIR 15/359 A.O.C.-in-C. Daily Conference dated 8 July 1941, indicating RN 
opposition to the return of the aircraft. 
256 Joubert de la Ferte, Birds, p. 150 
257  M. Howard, Grand Strategy: Vol. 4, (London: H.M.S.O., 1972), p. 24, see also W. S. Churchill, The Second 
World War Vol.3: The Grand Alliance, (London: Cassell, 1950), p. 450-452 for Churchill’s view on the primacy 
of Bomber Command in the allocation of resources.  This view was also shared by those operating the bomber 
59 
 
The escalating losses at sea increased the attention being paid to the trade defence 
war, and resulted in the first significant policy shift of the War to affect ASW, the Battle of 
the Atlantic Directive.258 This was accompanied by the formation of the Battle of the Atlantic 
Committee, which directed the Battle from March to October 1941.259  In principle, the 
elevation of the significance of this theatre of operations should have improved the priority of 
all agencies engaged in it, including Coastal Command.  However, the committee focused 
mainly on the management of dockyards and the Merchant Navy, with the main aerial aspect 
being aerodrome construction.260 Air power is conspicuous by its limited mention in the 
minutes of these meetings.  The RAF’s lack of attention to this strand of the conflict can be 
explained by their heavy engagement in other aspects of the War.   Whilst the First Sea Lord 
attended the early meetings, CAS did not attend any, the RAF, being represented, throughout 
by the more junior Deputy Chief of the Air Staff.261 
The ineffectiveness of this committee in improving the equipment situation of Coastal 
Command is attested to by the continuing complaints of shortfalls, even after the committee 
had concluded; a specific internal department was established to give direction of aircraft 
capability requirements in the on-going effort to address this.262  Churchill, however, claimed 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
fleet who were just as parochial as their maritime counterparts see, AIR 15/109 letter from AOC-in-C Bomber 
Command to AOC-in-C Coastal Command dated 19 September 1942 which gives a view on the benefits of the 
bomber offensive as opposed to the defensive nature of other areas of operations. 
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of the Battle of the Atlantic and the instigation of the corresponding committee, see Churchill, The Second 
World War Vol. 3, p. 106-107.  
259 CAB 86/1 minutes and memoranda of the Battle of the Atlantic Committee 
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60 
 
that the committee achieved all its aims prior to dissolution; there is some truth in this, as the 
detail of the original directive makes no mention of expanding Coastal Command.263 
However, the overall aim of defeating the U-boat was still far from achieved at this point. In 
reviewing the complaints of Coastal Command, it should be noted that many of the papers 
concerned originated from the AOC-in-C; the incumbent of this post changed in June 1941 
from Frederick Bowhill to Phillip Joubert de la Ferte.264  The latter was known for his more 
outspoken nature, possibly contributing to the increasingly forthright nature of the 
complaints.265   
A lull in losses in the summer of 1941 provided some optimism regarding the Battle 
of the Atlantic.266 Whilst this had the potential to weaken Coastal Command’s position, such 
optimism was quickly rejected with demands for more aircraft.267 The issue at stake was not 
only expansion, but also simply achieving and maintaining the Command’s allocated 
strength.268 This difficulty was seen to be compounded by the financial interests of aircraft 
manufacturers: 
‘unless a Command is prepared to lobby…an approved Air Ministry programme is 
allowed to fall behind performance because another Command has in a bigger 
order and is therefore financially more interesting’269 
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This formed another thread to Coastal Command’s complaints of shortages, though it 
was dismissed by the CAS as the ‘result of a misunderstanding’.270 
 Increased aircraft availability, brought about by the United States joining the War, 
had the potential go a long way to fulfilling Coastal Command demands; however, the impact 
of these new resources was blunted.  This was impacted by the American inability, or 
unwillingness, to understand the operational structure of the RN/RAF relationship, coupled 
with their own internal inter-Service conflicts over types and number of aircraft to be 
supplied.271 Allocation was determined by the Air Staff and the main constraint was, again, 
the conflict with the bomber forces, with an added international element; bombing advocates 
could cite the political dimension of using American aircraft be used in the offensive 
bombing role as evidence for marginalising ASW requirements.272 
The first meeting of the Battle of Atlantic Committee noted that ‘importance was 
attached to the employment of aircraft with a longer range than the Hudson.’273  Throughout 
its tenure, however, the committee failed to enact the necessary policies to fully exploit the 
potential of air power.  This was a failing, not only at the political level but also from the 
senior military officials involved, specifically those from the RAF; on the two occasions 
where comments were made defending the need for aircraft in the Battle of the Atlantic, these 
originated from RN representatives.274  Buckley suggests that the root of the reluctance to 
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equip Coastal Command was that it was ‘directed by the Admiralty’, indicating that inter-
Service rivalry was still alive and well.  This said, the RAF was far from homogeneous, with 
Coastal Command naturally aligning with the RN. Furthermore, the pressures of the conflict 
were such that it is fair to suggest the fight for resources owed far more too entrenched 
beliefs in the importance of offensive bombing than to political manoeuvring for individual 
Service status. 
It must be noted that competition for resources was an overriding characteristic of the 
conflict affecting all arms of the military, thus Bomber and Coastal Command were not 
simply competing with each other for resources.  Certain factors however placed these two 
Commands as direct adversaries. First, was the timing of the period of high operational 
tempo in each of their campaigns, which was such that both Commands felt their need for 
aircraft to be at its most acute at similar times.  Second, the nature of the tasks they 
performed meant that as was the case with radar sets both Commands often competed for the 
same airframes as in many cases an aircraft type could be employed with equal success in an 
ASW or a bombing role.  
 
Policy Shift 
When Bowhill stood down as AOC-in-C of Coastal Command in 1941, he felt ‘early 
difficulties and problems had been largely overcome… [and]…the value of air 
power…recognised’.275 Joubert de la Ferte’s arrival, however, signalled a shift in priorities 
towards tackling the Atlantic gap, as the technological advantage which was beginning to be 
enjoyed by the British was nullified by the large area in which they were unable to operate.  
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He also advocated moving from ‘a defensive – and consequently ineffective’ approach to an 
offensive one.276  The consequences of this policy shift were to change the focus of the 
demands for aircraft from number of aircraft towards types with the required range to work in 
the mid-Atlantic; these were requested both in the form of newly manufactured airframes and 
requests for transfers from other Commands.277 Again, the Admiralty was highly vocal in 
supporting Coastal Command’s requests.278  Coastal Command’s shift in demands and 
continued complaints of being ‘done down’ was still met with the same competition and 
resistance from the needs of Bomber Command.279  
Whilst the subject of conflict in policy-setting, the use of air power in ASW was also 
attracting support at the theoretical level.  During the War, Trenchard continued to interact 
with the very highest levels of the Service in addition to the upper levels of government, from 
his position in the House of Lords. Through these channels as well as pamphlets published at 
his personal expense, he continued to advocate the effectiveness of strategic bombing.280 It is, 
however, a measure of the shift of his opinion that in a 1942 essay Trenchard argued strongly 
for the offensive against submarines being within the remit of air power, to the subordination 
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of naval forces.281 Hence the individual who presided over an air force which squandered 
opportunities to develop ASW capability in the inter-war period had by the middle of the 
War shifted viewpoints.  However, organisations being significantly slower than individuals 
to change, the RAF as a whole continued to focus on strategic bombing, the support for 
which owed much to Trenchard’s promotion of its benefits.  
 Individuals at the top levels of organisations invariably have had long associations 
with them, hence several, like Trenchard, were in positions to influence airborne ASW in 
both peace and war time.  Notable amongst these were Arthur Harris and Maurice Hankey. 
Harris’ aggressive promotion of the benefits of strategic bombing befitted his position as 
AOC-in-C Bomber Command; it is noteworthy however that he held similar views prior to 
this appointment.282  The influence he exerted as Deputy Director of Plans in the Air 
Ministry, a post he held from 1934 to 1937, has already been seen.283  This was in many 
ways more damaging to airborne ASW than his later input in direct support of his own 
Command.284  Hankey’s influence is somewhat harder to define; he was at the centre of the 
work of the CID in the interwar years.285  In addition to his formal responsibilities as 
secretary he was also in a position to exert influence on the Service chiefs in a variety of 
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informal ways.286  Though he only served in the War Cabinet under Chamberlain, he was still 
involved in the government in a position to influence the key decision makers throughout the 
War.287  The demi-official and unofficial nature of much of the influence he exerted however 
makes it problematic to quantify.  
Joubert de la Ferte combined his agitation for increased resources for ASW with 
support for the use of bombing in the war against the U-boats.288 Indeed, the RN was rapidly 
overshadowing Coastal Command as the main campaigner for more ASW aircraft and 
specialist resources such as radar.289 The Admiralty’s role as the primary ASW air power 
advocate developed as the conflict continued.  They would continue to overshadow the RAF 
as the use of aircraft in ASW came to the fore in the policy priorities arena with the formation 
of the Anti-U-boat Warfare Committee in November 1942.290 
It is difficult to isolate an individual reason for the formation of the Anti-U-boat 
Warfare Committee, as it appears to result from a confluence of factors. These include the 
growing losses from U-boat sinking and the precariousness of Britain’s supply situation, the 
increased in available resources due to the entry of America into the war and the build-up of 
American troops in Britain in preparation for the operation to invade Europe placing an 
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increased emphasis on the SLOCs. The path of the War at this point can be viewed as being 
decided by two opposing centres of gravity: namely, whether the strategic bombing campaign 
would defeat Germany and whether Germany would gain sufficient advantage in the Battle 
of the Atlantic to force Britain into submission by strangulation of her supply lines.  The 
increased focus on trade defence shows an understanding of the need to balance the offensive 
and defensive efforts within the overall conflict.291 The official history cites the inability of 
the Service chiefs to resolve this debate necessitating the formation of the Committee as ‘the 
situation was so grave, and the Service had apparently made so little progress towards 
solving it.’292 Whilst Churchill is blamed in the Grand Strategy official history for taking so 
long to step in to address this issue, in his own account he takes credit for personally 
convening the committee.293  He cites the extent of the losses of merchant shipping as the 
impetus for the Committee as ‘So menacing were the conditions in the outer waters beyond 
the range of air cover’.294 
 This work of this Committee put great emphasis on the role of air power in defeating 
the U-boat. From the outset, CAS was a regular attendee and the use of aircraft in ASW 
formed a significant portion of the topics discussed.295  The work of this committee covered 
all aspects of ASW, for the air component this resulted in closing the Mid-Atlantic Gap 
through provision of Liberator aircraft, a shift to offensive operations against transiting U-
boats in the Bay of Biscay, increases in aircraft strength and work on providing improved 
                                                          
291 The debate record for both the Houses of Commons and Lords show questions from several members 
questioning progress in the anti-U-boat campaign especially in the early part of 1943.  
292Howard, Grand Strategy, p. 23 
293Howard, Grand Strategy, for an example of Churchill’s view on his personal responsibility for the Anti-U-
Boat Warfare Committee see Hansard HC Deb 15 December 1942 Vol. 385 cc1769-71. 
294W. S. Churchill, The Second World War Vol.4: The Hinge of Fate, (London: Cassell, 1951), p. 114. 
295 CAB 86/2 minutes of meetings of the Anti-U-Boat Warfare committee shows some new uses of aircraft 
against U-Boats were also discussed; see minutes dated 13 January 1943 for discussion of the potential of 
helicopters and airships in ASW. Though now part of the national archive section for the records of Cabinet 
committees these files were originally stored as part of the files relating to the Air Ministry. 
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anti-submarine weapons for aerial delivery.296 Coastal Command’s ability to successfully 
argue for resource increases was assisted by the ORS’s work in increasing the Command’s 
efficiency, thus enabling refutation of the suggestions they were not in need of additional 
aircraft.297 
The second significant indicator of this policy shift was the Casablanca Directive, 
which resulted from the conference of the same name in January 1943.298 In this, the 
Combined Chiefs of Staff report placed the priority on ASW; ‘defeat of the U-boat must 
remain a first charge on the resources of the United Nations’.299  The directive on strategic 
bombing resulting from the conference also placed attacks on the U-boat building facilities 
top of the priority order, an additional note advocated continuation of the attacks on the 
Biscay operating bases in the short term.300  Whilst the Casablanca directive shows the policy 
shift in prioritising ASW it also demonstrates the continuing primacy of the bomber.301  
The arrival of Slessor, who had been heavily involved in the Casablanca Conference, 
prompted another shift in priorities within Coastal Command. With the Atlantic gap largely 
closed he shifted the emphasis to the Bay of Biscay as ‘the decisive point on which we 
should concentrate’, this was also aimed at mitigating the risk posed to the forthcoming 
                                                          
296 CAB 86/2-86/7 
297 AIR 19/183 letter to Ministry of Aircraft Production dated 19 September 1941 suggests aircraft shortage in 
training units is causing a shortage of trained crews which is the limiting factor in Coastal Commands output, 
see also PREM 3/97/1 ‘Expansion of Coastal Command’ dated 4 June 1942.  Whilst the ORS investigation 
rejects this (PREM 3/97/1 letter CAS to Prime Minister dated 15 June 1942) it does lead to a planned flying and 
maintenance programme to increase efficiency see AIR 15/154 and AIR 15/341 for details. 
298 For detail on the Casablanca Conference and other decisions made see  A. Fredrick, W. Franklin and S. 
William, Foreign Relations of the United States: The Conferences at Washington 1941-1942 and Casablanca 
1943 (Washington: United States Government Printers Office, 1968), pp. 487-849 and A. Armstrong, 
Unconditional Surrender, (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1961)  
299 AIR 75/11 Conduct of the War in 1943 report by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
300 AIR 75/11 The Casablanca Directive dated 21 January 1943 
301 It has been argued that the Casablanca directive was deliberately framed in such a way to be open to wide 
interpretation thus accommodating the range of views present amongst the Allies without bringing them into 
further debate, see P. Gray, The Leadership, Direction and Legitimacy of the RAF Bomber Offensive from 
Inception to 1945, (London: Continuum international, 2012), pp. 209-212 and T. D. Biddle, Rhetoric and 
Reality in Air Warfare, (Woodstock, Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 214-215. 
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cross-Channel invasion.302  This focus on independent offensive operations was far more in 
line with the prevailing RAF thinking on the use of air power.303 
As early as the second meeting of Anti-U-boat committee, the CAS advocated the 
bombing of the U-boat operating bases in France and agreement for this was secured by the 
next meeting.304  The debate over the impact of this bombing campaign and its benefits 
versus offensive ASW operations in the Bay of Biscay continued for the duration of this 
committee.305 Throughout, the RN maintained its position in support of air power for ASW, 
continuing to press for more resources for Coastal Command’s ASW tasking whilst the RAF 
still championed the effectiveness of bombing, though this was split between advocates of 
bombing the Biscay bases and those promoting the main strategic campaign as the 
solution.306 
The U-boats were withdrawal from the Atlantic in 1943 though offensive operations 
against them continued in the Bay of Biscay.307 The official history in the form of Howard’s 
                                                          
302 Slessor, Central Blue, p. 512, Slessor had previously also worked in America on negotiating for aircraft, 
experience which doubtless stood him in good stead with regard to the significance of America’s input to 
Coastal Commands tasks. 
303 Slessor was a supporter of the offensive use of air power having previously commanded a bomber group, this 
focus on independent area operations shows the progress made in airborne ASW from its initial war role 
focused on direct support operations with the RN. Slessor was a devout follower of Trenchard, embracing many 
of his views on the use of air power, see Slessor, Central Blue, pp. 45-51 for a summary of his appreciation of 
Trenchard theories.  Also of note is that Slessor was a far less controversial figure in terms of falling in with the 
prevailing views of the Air Staff, see Orange, Slessor: Bomber Champion, pp. 99-100. 
304 CAB 86/2 minutes of meetings of the Anti-U-Boat Warfare committee dated 13 and 19 November 1942.  
305 CAB 86/2 the battle damage assessment of these raids continued to be debated due to several factors such as 
the rate of repair, the availability of alternate bases, the fact that the crews were billeted outside the areas 
attacked and the resistance of the German fortifications to air attack (see G. Williamson, U-boat Bases and 
Bunkers 1941-45, (Oxford: Osprey, 2003) and J. Showell, Hitler's U-boat bases, (Annapolis, Md.: Naval 
Institute Press, 2002) for more detail on the latter)) 
306 Howard, Grand Strategy, p. 315 gives detail on the objections raised by Harris to the dilution of his main 
bombing effort by the Biscay attacks. 
307 The U-boats were withdrawn on 24 May 1943 which is often stated as the end date of the Battle see D. 
Macintyre, The Battle of the Atlantic, (London, B.T. Batsford, 1961) p196, and Terraine, Business in great 
Waters, p. 607-9, this view is supported in the memoirs of the Commander of the German U-boat fleet, K. 
Doenitz, Memoirs, Ten Years and Twenty Days, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1997), p. 341 though two official 
histories differ, Admiralty, The Battle of the Atlantic : the official account of the fight against the U-boats, 
1939-1945, (London: H.M.S.O., 1946), placing it in May 1945 and Howard, Grand Strategy, stating September 
1943 as the end date. 
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Grand Strategy records that ‘the contribution of the air force to this victory had been 
considerable, perhaps decisive’.308  Despite this acknowledgement and that fact that Coastal 
Command had moved from a marginalised force on the periphery of the Battle of the Atlantic 
to a position of central responsibility in winning it, the debate over the effects of bombing the 
U-boat bases was left unresolved.309 With the Atlantic threat largely neutralised, the war 
against the U-boat continued elsewhere; in home waters, the next task of significance for 
ASW was the support of the D-day landings. By this point the situation was considered 
sufficiently stable for the Anti-U-boat Warfare committee to be rolled up into another 
focused on the invasion preparations.310 
The Anti-U-boat Warfare Committee can be seen as the pinnacle of the formulation 
of airborne ASW policy as it provided a forum whereby the on-going debates could finally be 
drawn to some form for resolution. It provided a forum whereby if the RN and RAF could 
not reach a consensus then at least the matter could be resolved expediently; in most cases the 
arbiter appeared to be Churchill.311  He usually chaired the meetings in his role as Prime 
Minister, but he also held the post of Minister of Defence, since taking office. The 
significance of this post is that it was a creation of Churchill’s, following in the place of the 
previous Minister for Co-ordination of Defence.  In creating this position Churchill had given 
himself deliberately vague terms of reference and consequently more power and authority, in 
his own words he had been; 
‘careful not to define my rights and duties….It was however understood and 
accepted that I should assume the general direction of the war.’312 
 
                                                          
308 Howard, Grand Strategy, p. 311 
309 Ibid., p. 311-317 
310 Churchill, The Second World War Vol. 4, p. 518. 
311 CAB 86/2 minutes of meetings of the Anti-U-Boat Warfare committee 
312 W. S. Churchill, The Second World War Vol.2: Their Finest Hour, (London; Cassell, 1949), p. 15 
70 
 
He continues from this statement emphasising the power of this post when combined with 
that of Prime Minister whilst elsewhere emphasising his control over the military 
apparatus.313 His autocratic style in executing this can be seen in his personal approval of the 
initiation of the Biscay bombing raids, having previously stated a need for referral to the War 
cabinet.314  It many ways it can be argued that Churchill held the balance of power in the 
debate of strategic bombing versus trade defence. Hence, the relative influence of the RN and 
RAF on airborne ASW policy at this time is largely determined by their ability to influence 
Churchill. 
The conduct of the Battle of the Atlantic can be seen as the peak of policy priority for 
Airborne ASW. However, this was only after the culmination of the interwar policies had 
proved their ineffectiveness in battle.  Whilst the fundamental competition with bombers for 
resources remained a constant, the pressures of the conflict forced opinion shifts in some 
individuals and organisations, while others maintained a slavish adherence to their inter-war 
positions.  The speed of change varied across those involved; at the command level the 
Services were able to act with characteristic flexibility to the opening stages of the conflict, 
while the shift in control to the political level and the relative sluggishness of the political 
leadership to adapt led to effort being devoted to investigating matters of operational control, 
rather than more pressing issues of front line aircraft.  This highlighted not only the initial 
inadequacies of the political leadership but an underlying belief that such issues had not been 
adequately resolved despite significant efforts in the reviews of 1937. It would thus be some 
time before the inter-war cultural legacy of deprioritising ASW aircraft would be eroded by 
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threat of defeat by constriction of the SLOCs. Hence, ASW policy owed far more to the 
exigencies of war than to the input of the RN and RAF. 
 The end of the War in Europe brought about a swift reduction of Coastal Command, 
with many aircraft and personnel being transferred to other commands, notably Transport 
Command which was still heavily engaged in the fight against Japan.315  Mirroring the 
reduction of the maritime squadrons after the First World War, Coastal Command’s 
contraction was rapid, though it did survive as an independent command.316  Competition for 
limited resources would continue in peacetime, impacted by the evolving relationship 
between the Services and the British defence industry; a recurrent issue would be procuring 
aircraft fit for the specific requirements of ASW.317 War experience had converted the RN to 
the importance of air power in ASW and they remained foremost amongst its supporters.318  
With the constraints of conducting war removed, inter-Service rivalry would again blossom 
with the new battleground of the provision of the nuclear deterrent.319  In time the Soviet 
Union would come to replace Germany as the principal sub-surface threat, as the advent of 
nuclear powered submarines introduced new challenges into ASW.320 Britain’s move to a 
submarine-borne nuclear deterrent in 1968 fundamentally shifted the landscape against which 
                                                          
315 PREM 3/97/2 memorandum from VCAS to Prime Minister dated 9 June 1945 reports the reassignment of 
aircraft and personnel. 
316 PREM 3/97/2 shows the speed with which this was undertaken. 
317 See Ashworth, Coastal Command, pp. 196-211 for narrative on Coastal Command in the immediate post-war 
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72 
 
airborne ASW was conducted.321  The advent of the Nuclear age would redefine relationships 
between the Services and the structure of Britain’s defence establishment. For ASW this 
would have far reaching policy consequences which would require a separate study for their 
examination.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
321 J. Moore (Ed.), The Impact of Polaris: The Origins of Britain's Seaborne Nuclear Deterrent, (Huddersfield: 
Richard Netherwood, 1999).The situation is further complicated by the use of submarines for other tasks such as 
surveillance and insertion of ground forces. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
 ‘the submarine has been mastered’ 322 
‘The only thing that ever really frightened me during the war was the U-boat peril.’323 
 
The above quotes, bridging the Second World War, show it to have been the 
culmination of interwar policy setting and the decisive episode in the history of airborne 
ASW. The test of battle showed the extent of the errors in inter-war policy regarding this 
capability area. It has been seen that the history of airborne ASW policy is far more than just 
that of a single Command or indeed a single Service; it involved several agencies, resulting 
more often in conflict than in co-operation. Thus the previous discussed discrepancy between 
the official histories is resolved as the records conclusively support the view of Grand 
Strategy series that there was considerable inter-Service conflict in this area. 
The net effect of this was a tumultuous experience for airborne ASW as it struggled to 
gain and maintain appropriate policy priority. This would manifest itself in a variety of ways 
in the inter-war period.  Faith in naval sonar capabilities was so strong that, coupled with the 
other factors affecting the RAF in its battle for definition and indeed existence, there was in 
reality no policy for airborne ASW. Wartime pragmatism and early experience brought some 
change, though this was limited by the prevalent mantra of strategic bombing. With conduct 
of the military now more closely controlled at the political level, it would take significant 
time for airborne ASW to gain traction in policy setting.  It would not be until losses at sea 
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threatened Britain's ability to continue fighting that ASW would be catapulted to the forefront 
of the policy debate.  This hiatus in the relatively neglected position of airborne ASW would 
be critical to Britain’s ability to continue the War, though it did not change many of the 
underlying beliefs regarding the use of air power, and as Britain moved towards a peace 
footing, ASW again became a low priority.  
 The intrinsically inter-Service nature of this topic means that the conclusions draw on 
areas beyond just Britain’s maritime aviation forces.  The nature of the interface between the 
armed forces and politics and how this serves to shape and define individual Services and 
Commands along with their cultures is of major significance.  In common with all other 
aspects of air power for the period under discussion the study of ASW is implicitly also the 
study of strategic bombing policy, as this capability area overshadowed all others.  Whilst the 
"Cinderella" relationship of ASW to other sections of the RAF especially Bomber Command 
is possibly somewhat oversold by those closest to it, understanding the nature of this 
competition between capabilities is key to understanding how the use of air power developed. 
Also fundamental in ASW policy has been the role of technology in defining capabilities and 
the role of key individuals, both of which find resonance across most military topics.   
 
The Interface between the Services and the Political Sphere 
 The nature and level of the interface between the political and the military spheres 
shifts through the period being studied. During the interwar period, the lack of a centralised 
ministry to run defence led to a diffuse and thus less efficient military establishment.  
Peaking with the chaotic rearmament process in the 1930s, this allowed internal rivalries to 
75 
 
flourish.  At this point, economic pressures rather than sound threat assessments and 
associated planning assumptions formed the basis for defence policy decisions.   
With austerity affecting all aspects of defence, Service leaders had to prioritise the 
political position of their Services over the overall effectiveness of British defence. The 
primary role of senior officers became ensuring the continued existence and standing of their 
Service. Thus, certain capabilities such as strategic bombing were championed as gambits in 
the political interaction between the Services, naturally resulting in less attention for other 
areas such as ASW.  The resultant failures in policy are indicative of the failure of politicians 
to provide a suitable economic situation to allow the Service chiefs to focus on strategic, 
rather than financial, issues.  The result of this was the melee of rearmament in the late 1930s 
as the inadequacies of this approach were exposed by the impending conflict. The swing of 
the political approach to defence policy in the inter-war period, moving from peace treaties 
and disarmament to deterrence through parity, highlighted the need for flexibility on the part 
of the military in terms of capability provision. The ability to be able to react to shifts in 
political direction was a challenge which would only increase as military equipment became 
more complex and hence the lead time for the introduction of new capabilities increased. 
 Mirroring the way in which peacetime inter-Service wrangling had pushed military 
officers to develop the manoeuvring skills of politicians, the outbreak of conflict had a 
similar effect placing politicians in military leadership roles as the War Cabinet assumed 
closer control of Britain’s armed forces.  This serves to highlight that the organisational 
flexibility innate in military structures was absent from their political counterparts.  Although 
the RN had adapted to the needs of the conflict in terms of the use of aircraft in ASW, 
politicians still focused on the issues of operational control, which had been at the forefront 
in peacetime but were an unwelcome and somewhat unbelievable diversion during the 
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conflict.  The strongest criticism which can be levelled at the politicians was the policy lag 
caused by the continued prioritisation of bombers and their sluggishness in heeding the calls 
for more resources for ASW.  This must be contextualised not only in light of the continued 
demands from Bomber Command along with other sections of the RAF, which matched 
those from the RN and Coastal Command, but more significantly the nature of the advice 
received from the officers at the upper levels of the Services.  For most of the interwar period 
the threat from and the offensive capability of strategic bombing had consistently been 
emphasised by the military.  In contrast, the demands for aircraft for offensive ASW were a 
new feature, albeit supported by both the RN and Coastal Command, resultant of the early 
experiences of the conflict.  Indeed, in the last years of peace even Coastal Command did not 
envisage the value of air power in ASW beyond a mainly observational role.  Given that 
bombing still had massive support across the RAF, the weight of expert opinion was clearly 
stacked on one side, extending logically to political support for bombing at the expense of 
ASW. The fact that much of the strength of opinion supporting bombing was rooted in the 
era of austerity when the RAF needed to champion an air specific capability to ensure its 
survival should, however, have engendered more debate.  Hence, demonstrating the need to 
take into consideration the context in which expert opinion is forged before it is acted on. 
 
Service Cultures 
The damaging effects of inter-Service rivalry based on self-interest rather than 
strategic requirements, in which ASW policy became a major battleground, have been 
demonstrated. This created an environment dominated by single-Service thinking, whereby 
those at the top of the Services found themselves culturally incapable of developing a joint 
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mind-set at the policy level.  This forged a cyclical relationship whereby the lack of effective 
co-operation prevented the growth of an effective joint operating culture, which in turn 
inhibited effective co-operation.  At the lower levels of the organisations, the effectiveness of 
inter-Service co-operation was far greater. At the Command level there had been some 
success in developing an effective joint operating culture, enabling RAF personnel to operate 
effectively with their RN counterparts.  
The RAF itself was far from homogenous and internal conflicts added to inter-Service 
competition providing a further obstacle to the development of ASW policy.  Coastal 
Command’s relationship with the rest of the RAF can be viewed as a microcosm of the place 
of the RAF in defence as a whole, as it constantly battled for appropriate resources that were 
only supplied under the pressures of conflict.  
ASW policy was thus a victim of a wider challenge for the armed forces as a whole: 
balancing the development of technical specialists in specific areas of warfare whilst 
avoiding parochialism, and building and maintaining the requisite esprit de corps without 
recourse to inter- and intra-Service rivalries.  These issues can be observed in the 
development of the RAF as a new service in the interwar years, and raise further questions 
regarding appropriate structures for the defence establishment.  In ASW policy this challenge 
can be seen in the deadlock reached during the Second World War between the Air Ministry 
and the Admiralty, with the latter becoming the prime air power advocate.  That airborne 
ASW falls between the natural spheres of operation of the two Services compounded this 
issue and shows the negative impact of defining the threat as being specifically naval or air, 
as a joint approach to combating a threat in the first place requires a joint definition of that 
threat. The immediate implications of this were that it could well have been avoided by an 
alternate approach to the control of maritime air power, diluting the power of the Air 
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Ministry, whilst in wider terms the challenge lay in developing a true joint structure for 
determining defence policy.  
More significant than the battle over resources was the role played by the general 
interaction between the RN and the RAF in the policy-setting process. This combined with 
their internal cultures in necessitating ad-hoc structures such as the Anti-U-boat Warfare 
Committee whilst not making long term structural changes, thus shaping the ways in which it 
was possible for airborne ASW policy to be developed. The official history blames Service 
chiefs for not resolving the debate over trade defence versus bombing, necessitating the 
formation of the Anti-U-boat Warfare Committee.   However, the politicians who claim 
credit for having resolved the situation also deserve a share of the blame for creating the 
peacetime cultural legacy under which the Services were operating. 
 
Selection of Capabilities 
Bombing policy was the single most influential factor in retarding the development of 
ASW policy.  A superficial critique would claim that the order of battle with which the RAF 
entered the Second World War resulted from an indefensible lack of foresight caused by 
inappropriate faith in the role of bombing in a large scale conflict.  In the interwar period, it 
can be argued that the belief in the effects of bombing was still somewhat of a myth as it had 
yet to be proved operationally, however this only served to ensure that making the case 
against it in favour of other capabilities was even more difficult.  It must be remembered, 
however, that the use of air power was still in a relatively early stage of evolution and the 
most respected contemporary theorists supported the primacy of bomber capability. 
Furthermore, the offensive nature of bombing made it far more readily acceptable to 
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conventional military thinking.  It is noteworthy that when airborne ASW did finally gain 
ground at the policy level its emphasis had shifted away from the support and reconnaissance 
focus of the interwar period to independent offensive operations.  The experiences of conflict 
were to prove the shortcomings of this myopic approach to the provision of defence 
capabilities.  The policy shift this caused was, by its nature, policy by necessity, and did little 
to diminish adherence to the principles of strategic bombing.  The description of the support 
of strategic bombing as ‘an almost passionate faith’ goes someway to explain this; like any 
passionate belief, a monumental weight of decisive evidence would be needed to shift the 
dogmatic confidence in this capability which was proving effective in its area of the 
conflict.324 A similar critique can be levelled against the belief placed in ASDIC in the 
interwar period, again unproven in conflict it formed the cornerstone of an entire area of 
defence. 
The primary conclusion which may be drawn from this is the necessity of a balanced 
force with capability breadth, which would have included more provision for ASW.  It must 
also be noted that in the time period under discussion maritime patrol aircraft enjoyed the 
benefitted from a high degree of interoperability with those used as bombers.  This allowed 
relatively simple role changing of aircraft as the needs of the conflict and resultant policy 
direction dictated thus limiting the negative impact of many of the early policy decisions not 
to increase the strength of ASW aircraft.  Secondary to this is the danger of excessively 
emphasising one capability area, the worth of which has yet to be proven.  This highlights the 
value of trials and exercises in quantifying capability effectiveness, rather than reliance on 
papers founded on theoretical extrapolations.  Hence had there been more joint ASW 
exercises in the interwar period it may well have had a positive impact on policy setting. 
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Furthermore, throughout the period under examination the impact of policy decisions was 
been tempered by the procurement process and the aircraft production industry which if not 
controlled can exert its own influence on defence capabilities. 
 
The Role of Technology 
 ASW evolved as a highly technical discipline, and it was the ability of aircraft to 
exploit technological advances which made them a decisive factor in defeating the U-boat 
during the Second World War.  The role played by technology in the conflict as a whole 
would cause resource competition in the military to include not only funding, personnel and 
machines, but also scientific expertise for research and development, as the need to 
practically exploit any technological advantage became increasingly apparent.  The ORS is 
the success story of this shift, showing the RAF exploiting technological advantage to act as a 
force multiplier, an approach which is still very much part of contemporary policy. 
 Technology came with drawbacks, as the relationship between technological 
advances and policy struggled for definition.  In the case of ASDIC, it can be seen that 
technology was clearly in a dominant position, with claims for the abilities of this new 
technology leading policy setting and defining the overall approach to ASW.  The potential 
pitfall of technology leading policy was shown when ASDIC did not prove to be the 
definitive solution that it had claimed to be.  This shows the dangers of a panacea-like 
technological solution being allowed to dominate an area of defence, and the error of 
assuming a policy approach based on the desire to exploit a specific technology rather than 
the effect required from a capability.  Conversely, the numerous technological successes of 
the trade defence war, such as the maritime search radar, the Leigh light, aerial depth charges 
81 
 
and sonobuoys, were based on the development of technology to fulfil requirements defined 
in policy setting. ASW thus offers an excellent example of how policy-led technological 
developments can prove the decisive factor in a campaign.  This was, however, only the case 
when the technologies in question were born from the contemporary operational needs in an 
environment permissive to their research and development. 
 
Personalities 
 As with any historical study, the role of personalities in ASW policy cannot be 
overlooked, as the history of policy setting is constituted of the idiosyncrasies of individual 
personalities and their interactions as much as it is of large organisations and institutions.  
The influence of the individuals in key positions can clearly have a disproportionate impact 
on the course of events, enhanced by the structural deficiencies of the defence organisation 
already discussed. 
The longevity of the involvement of several of the personalities involved allows the 
development of their attitudes to be seen before they held key positions in the decisions 
making process.  In the case of Harris,  his belief in the importance of strategic bombing in 
winning a conflict can be traced to early in his career; others, such as Trenchard himself, can 
be seen to shift opinions on ASW as it evolved while still holding to their early beliefs in 
bombing.  Churchill, one of the central actors, is the hardest to analyse. Although heralded 
for his unique and decisive contribution to the Second World War, it has been seen that his 
single-mindedness regarding ASW and bombing had its near-disastrous consequences. The 
two quotes at the head of this chapter serve to highlight his fallibility.  In him we certainly 
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see an individual as concerned with securing his place in posterity as much as perceptions of 
him in his own time.325   
The impact of any of these individuals is worthy of a study in its own right, though 
some overall conclusions as to the general nature of individual influence can be drawn.  
Firstly, the significance of a specific personality cannot be viewed in isolation.  Churchill’s 
support of bombing was all the more effective due to his good relationship with Portal; 
equally, Trenchard's relationship and patronage of Harris must have had some responsibility 
for the strength and forthright nature of the latter’s views.  Secondly, whilst Trenchard and 
Hankey demonstrate the continued influence that some can wield having left central 
positions, the formative years of such individuals are also key.  For RAF officers, having 
served through years when their service struggled for its very existence doubtless did not help 
to foster a healthy joint attitude.  To understand those in senior positions it would also be 
necessary to understand the process by which they were appointed, who had supported their 
early career and who made the decision to put them in their more influential roles.  Thus it 
can be seem that whilst problematic to empirically asses, the role of personality is key to 
understanding the policy decision making process.   
 Numerous factors resulted in the poor formulation of airborne ASW policy.  Several 
of these were universal to defence capabilities in this period such as austerity, inter-Service 
rivalries and the role of specific individuals in influencing the course of events in an 
inadequate control structure for defence.  Others were ASW specific such as the use of 
various technological advances and the perceptions of the relative worth of protecting SLOCs 
against taking the offensive to the enemy using bombing.  Ultimately however the failings in 
                                                          
325 Reynolds, In Command of History, gives a detailed analysis of Churchill’s role as a historian expanding on 
his ‘firm intention’ (p. xxi) to shape perceptions of his premiership.  
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ASW policy can be seen to centre on the inability of the RN and RAF to move beyond their 
silos of thinking to cross traditional Service boundaries and produce an effective joint 
approach to ASW. 
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